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Congress created 180-day exclusivity for generic drug applicants in the 1984
Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)' and amended the provision substantially in the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).2 The fundamental
goal behind 180-day exclusivity was to provide an incentive for generic drug ap-
plicants to challenge innovator patents, and the core of the concept-as it has
been applied by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the courts-is
that the first generic drug applicant to challenge an innovator's patent is entitled
to six months of exclusivity against subsequent patent challengers for the same
innovator drug. 180-day exclusivity is governed by sections 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) and
505(j)(5)(D) of the FDCA.
Although the basic idea is simple and the language enacted in 1984 was cor-
respondingly brief, over the years the provision gave rise to a substantial number
of interpretive disputes both at the agency and in the courts. More than five years
have passed since enactment of the 2003 revisions, and the law governing the 1984
provisions is nearly settled.' Applicants and the agency have begun to grapple with
interpretation of the new provisions enacted in 2003, and although the new provi-
sions appear likely to raise interpretive issues that will be vigorously contested, to
date there have been no court decisions.
This is the third in a series of articles on 180-day exclusivity. The first article
traced the history of 180-day exclusivity from 1984 through its amendment in
2003 and court cases in 2004.4 A second article, published by two of the authors in
2007, updated the earlier piece through the end of 2006 but was arranged by issue
rather than in a chronology.' This article, which includes a third author, provides
. Mr. Kom is Senior Assistant General Counsel at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), Washington, DC.
Ms. Lietzan is a Partner in the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC.
Ms. Scott is an associate at the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC. The opinions
expressed in this article are those of the authors.
I Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984).
2 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
3 There is one citizen petition pending relating to the old rules. See Apotex, Inc., Petition for Stay of
Action, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-0 117 (Feb. 13, 2008) (pending); It, however, should be considered moot in
light of a recent court decision upholding the validity of the patent at issue. At a Food and Drug Law Institute
(FDLI) conference on the Hatch-Waxman Amendments (Feb. 5,2009), Elizabeth Dickinson-Associate Chief
Counsel for Drugs, Office of the Chief Counsel, FDA-stated that there are roughly 12 innovator products
with ANDAs pending that are subject to the old rules.
I Erika Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch- Waxman Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004). A subsequent update traced
developments in 2004. Erika Lietzan, 2004 Update-180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch- Waxman Amend-
ments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FooD & DRUG L.J. 459 (2004).
5 Erika Lietzan, & David E. Kom, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD &
DRUG L. J. 49 (2007).
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a comprehensive resource on 180-day exclusivity for old abbreviated new drug ap-
plications (ANDAs) 6 (but less detail in some places where the 2007 article may be
referenced) but focus more discussion on the new provisions as well as some policy
and legal issues related to 180-day exclusivity that the authors have not previously
addressed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Original Statutory Language
Between 1984 and 2003, section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the FDCA provided that:
[i]f the [abbreviated new drug] application contains a certification described
in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii) [otherwise known as a "para-
graph IV certification" 7] and is for a drug for which a previous application
has been submitted under this subsection continuing [sic "containing"] such
a certification, the application shall be made effective not earlier than one
hundred and eighty days after-(I) the date the Secretary receives notice
from the applicant under the previous application of the first commercial
marketing of the drug under the previous application, or (II) the date of
a decision of a court in an action described in clause (iii) holding the pat-
ent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed,
whichever is earlier.8
Put another way, the first9 generic applicant to file an ANDA containing a para-
graph IV certification was to be awarded 180 days of exclusivity, during which FDA
could not approve a subsequent ANDA that challenged a patent for the same drug
product. The 180 days was calculated from either the date of the first commercial
marketing of the generic drug product by the first applicant (with a paragraph IV
certification) or the date of a court decision declaring the patent invalid or not
infringed, whichever was earlier.
B. Revised Statutory Language
Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) now provides that:
[i]f the [abbreviated new drug] application contains a certification described
in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) [a paragraph IV certification] and is a drug
for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing such a
6 The authors refer to ANDAs subject to the original provisions as "old ANDAs" and ANDAs subject
to the 2003 legislation as "new ANDAs."
I A company seeking approval of a generic product must submit with its ANDA a certification
with respect to each patent that claims the reference drug or claims a use of the reference drug. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). If the ANDA applicant seeks to market its product prior to expiration of any such pat-
ent, the ANDA applicant submits a "paragraph IV certification" asserting that the patent for which the
certification is submitted is invalid or will not be infringed by the proposed generic product. 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984) (amended 2003).
1 Although the statute referred to "previous" ANDAs, it was interpreted over time to mean that only
the first applicant was eligible. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,875 (Aug. 6, 1999) (stating that FDA's
regulations "interpret[] the statute as allowing eligibility for exclusivity only for the applicant that submits
the first substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification").
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certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is 180
days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including
the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant. 0
In short, as before, the first generic applicant to file an ANDA containing a
paragraph IV certification is awarded 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during
which FDA may not approve a subsequently filed ANDA that challenged a patent
for the same drug product. The exclusivity period is now calculated from the date
of the first commercial marketing of the drug product (including the listed drug
product) by a first applicant. A court decision does not start the exclusivity period
for new ANDAs.
Congress also added an elaborate provision governing forfeiture of 180-day
exclusivity. Under section 505(j)(5)(D), the 180-day exclusivity period is forfeited
by a first applicant if the applicant fails to market the drug by the later of: 1) 75
days after the date on which approval of its application is effective, or 30 months
after its application was submitted, whichever is earlier; or 2) 75 days after the date
on which, as to each patent that is the subject of a paragraph IV certification by
the first applicant (qualifying it for exclusivity), a court finds the patent invalid or
not infringed, a court signs a settlement order or consent decree finding the pat-
ent invalid or not infringed, or the patent information is withdrawn by the holder
of the approved new drug application (NDA). The first applicant also forfeits the
exclusivity period if any of the following occurs: 1) the first applicant withdraws
its application or FDA considers it withdrawn because it did not meet the require-
ments for approval; 2) the first applicant amends or withdraws all of the paragraph
IV certifications that qualified it for exclusivity; 3) the first applicant fails to obtain
tentative approval of its application within 30 months after it was filed (unless the
failure is caused by a change in or review of the requirements for approval of the
application imposed after it was filed); 4) the first applicant enters into an agree-
ment with another ANDA applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or a court finds that the agreement violates the
antitrust laws; or 5) all of the patents as to which the first applicant filed a para-
graph IV certification qualifying it for exclusivity have expired. Forfeiture events
are determined individually for each first applicant. If all first applicants forfeit
their 180-day exclusivity, any subsequent ANDA approval may be made effective
immediately; exclusivity does not roll over to a subsequent ANDA applicant.I
Congress also added definitions to the statute for "180-day exclusivity period,"
"first applicant," "substantially complete application," and "tentative approval."
Some of these reflected new concepts. A "first applicant" is "an applicant that, on the
first day on which a substantially complete application containing a [paragraph IV
certification] is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete
application that contains and lawfully maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for
the drug."' 2 A "substantially complete application" means "an application under
this subsection that on its face is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review
and contains all the information required by [section 505(j)(2)(A)]."' 3
In general, the amended provisions apply only to ANDAs filed after December
8, 2003, and only if there was no paragraph IV certification to the listed drug prior
10 21 U.S.C. § 355j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2003).
It 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
12 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)(bb).
13 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(ll)(cc).
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to that date.'4 The exceptions relate to the "court decision" trigger for exclusivity,
described below in section II.B.3.a., and the forfeiture event for certain settlement
agreements, discussed below in section III.A.6.
C. FDA's Approach to Interpreting the Exclusivity Provisions
The 2003 amendments to the 180-day exclusivity provisions have created two
paradigms governing 180-day exclusivity (three, if one counts the paradigm before
the 2003 changes that were retroactive). The agency's interpretation of the old statu-
tory provisions was fleshed out in regulations, guidance, and responses to citizen
petitions, and-as discussed below-the federal courts played a significant role in
shaping this interpretation. The agency has proposed no regulations to implement
the new statutory provisions, it has issued only one draft guidance, 5 and no court
has interpreted the new provisions. Moreover, at the end of February 2009, only
three petitions relating to 180-day exclusivity submitted since the authors' last article
were pending before FDA, 6 and there were no open dockets requesting comments
on an exclusivity issue.
The dearth of pending petitions and open dockets before FDA may be due, in
part, to the fact that the agency and courts resolved many of the interpretative
issues concerning the pre-2003 statutory language and the fact that many of the
rules and policies governing 180-day exclusivity for new ANDAs are presumed to
be the same. Another explanation may be that the agency has been addressing new
interpretative issues more quickly than it did the older issues.
Between 2007 and 2008, FDA received approximately 13 petitions relating to
180-day exclusivity issues,' 7 and it opened five nonrulemaking dockets. The agency
responded to nine of these petitions in approximately seven months or fewer. Three
petitions are currently pending, and one was withdrawn. FDA also issued its re-
sponses in the five nonrulemaking dockets within eight months. During the previous
"4 See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b)(1), 117 Stat. 2066,2460 (2003); FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry,
Listed Drugs, 30-Month Stays, and Approval of ANDAs and 505(b)(2) Applications Under Hatch-Waxman,
as Amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Questions
and Answers 12 (Oct. 2004). FDA recently announced that when one or more ANDAs were submitted to
the agency before December 8, 2003, but the first paragraph IV certification was submitted after December
3, 2003, it would apply the pre-MMA statutory 180-day exclusivity provisions to these applications. Letter
from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to ANDA Applicants (Apr. 15, 2009).
15 See FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry, Listed Drugs, 30-Month Stays, and Approval ofANDAs and
505(b)(2) Applications Under Hatch-Waxman, as Amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Questions and Answers (Oct. 2004).
'6 SeeNovoNordisk, Inc., Petition for Reconsideration, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-0343 (Dec. 19,2008);
Novo Nordisk Inc., Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-0343 (Dec. 20, 2008); Apotex,
Inc., Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-0 117 (Feb. 13, 2008). Of the three outstanding
petitions, two were submitted in December 2008 in response to a denial by FDA of the filer's initial petition.
Although FDA has not responded to the other remaining petition, that petition should be considered moot
due to a recent court decision upholding the validity of the patent at issue.
17 The authors count separately any filing styled as a petition-for example, a citizen petition, a petition
for stay of action, or a petition for reconsideration-if it related to 180-day exclusivity. Separate petitions were
counted separately, even if filed by the same party relating to the same product. The authors have included
two petitions submitted by Cobalt concerning bioequivalence issues because they were relevant to FDA's
determination that Cobalt did not forfeit its period of 180-day exclusivity due to a failure to obtain tentative
approval in a timely fashion. The authors have also included four petitions submitted by Novo Nordisk and
Caraco regarding whether Caraco may submit, with its ANDA to market a generic version of Prandin (repa-
glinide), a split certification-meaning both a paragraph IV certification and a section viii statement-with
respect to Novo Nordisk's patent, which includes separate claims for the drug and a method of using the
drug. A "section viii statement," authorized by section 505(j)(2)(A)(viii) of the FDCA, refers to a method
of use patent listed in the Orange Book which does not claim a use for which the applicant seeks approval.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). FDA's decision in this matter affects whether Caraco, as the first applicant to
submit an ANDA to market generic repaglinide, will be able to retain its split certification and thus whether
it will be eligible for 180-day exclusivity based on its paragraph IV certification.
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two-year period, between 2005 and 2006, FDA received about half as many petitions
and opened no dockets relating to 180-day exclusivity. While it responded to two
related petitions within one month of receiving them, it took the agency an average
of approximately 10 months to respond to the other three petitions it received. One
of the six petitions received during 2005 and 2006 was withdrawn.
The increased pace of FDA's responses to more recent interpretative issues may be
explained in part by the fact that when the agency opens a nonrulemaking docket,
the issue to be addressed is typically one with an impending deadline (e.g., final
approval of an ANDA or ANDAs and an exclusivity determination). In addition,
seven of the 13 petitions submitted between 2007 and 2008 included a certification
under new section 505(q) of the FDCA, which requires FDA to respond to certain
petitions requesting action on pending ANDAs within 180 days."
Just under half of the petitions submitted in 2007 and 2008 concerned agency
practice with respect to the application of the old statutory provisions. This percent-
age will decrease in the future, because-as noted above-there are few products
for which old ANDAs are currently pending. 9 Of the five nonrulemaking dockets
the agency opened over the last two years to address 180-day exclusivity issues, one
concerned the application of the old provisions, three concerned the application
of the new provisions (specifically the forfeiture provisions), and one concerned
the application of both the new and old provisions (including the settlement agree-
ment forfeiture provision). At least four of these five dockets appear to have been
initiated in response to a letter or a lawsuit seeking particular action with respect
to an ANDA or ANDAs. The agency has used these dockets to address complex
interpretative issues, particularly in the case of the forfeiture provisions, by seek-
ing input from interested parties.2" While this practice is not new,2 the frequency
with which FDA has opened nonrulemaking dockets related to 180-day exclusivity
issues in the last two years appears to be without precedent.
Some observers have criticized the agency's use of nonrulemaking dockets, in lieu
of rulemaking, to address issues related to forfeiture. They have expressed concern
that this practice "reduces the certainty" for ANDA applicants and thus "limits
their ability to plan" due to the lack of guidance from the agency.22 Some also
contend that FDA's practice of making decisions on a case-by-case basis instead of
considering forfeiture issues more broadly in a rulemaking may weaken the agency's
position in lawsuits. 23 In light of this practice and the concerns associated with it,
some have speculated that the courts will play a significant role in interpreting the
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F). Section 505(q) does not, however, apply to "a petition that relates
solely to the timing of the approval of an application pursuant to [the 180-day exclusivity provision]." 21
U.S.C. § 355(q)(4)(A).
" See supra text accompanying note 3.
20 The agency has stated that it established these dockets in recognition of the "substantial interest"
in forfeiture events and to obtain comments from interested parties on the interpretation and application of
the provisions. FDA, Decision Letter: Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417
(Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 7, 2008), at 5; FDA, Decision Letter: Granisetron Hydrochloride
Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269)
(Jan. 17, 2008), at 2.
21 For example, in May 2001 FDA established a public docket (Docket No. 2001N-0103) to receive
comment on whether pediatric exclusivity for an innovator runs concurrently or consecutively with 180-day
exclusivity for the first generic applicant. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,983 (May 21, 2001).
22 See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg, Generic Exclusivity Debate Continues at FDA: What Counts as a
Forfeit?, PINK SHEET, vol. 69, no. 43 (Oct. 22, 2007).
2 FDA Law Blog, FDA Solicits Public Comment on Yet Another 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity
Issue (Oct. 12,2007), available athttp://www.fdalawblog.net/fda law bloghymanphelps/2007/l 0/fda-so-
licits-pu.html; Brenda Sandburg, Generic Exclusivity Debate Continues at FDA: What Counts as a Forfeit?,
PINK SHEET, vol. 69, no. 43 (Oct. 22, 2007).
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forfeiture provisions.2" As discussed below in section II.B.4., however, there may
be practical impediments to judicial resolution of forfeiture issues.
At least one FDA representative has defended the agency's practice of using
nonrulemaking dockets to address complex issues by noting that the comments
received in response to these solicitations have in general been more thoughtful
than comments typically received in response to a notice of proposed rulemaking,
because they were submitted by parties who had a real interest in the matters be-
ing considered.25 Rulemaking may generate fewer thoughtful or helpful comments
than would a nonrulemaking docket because generic manufacturers, who may at
times be first applicants and at other times be subsequent applicants, depending
on the circumstances, may be less inclined to take a position on an issue raised as
part of a rulemaking that could affect first applicants and subsequent applicants
differently.
Whether or not FDAs current practice of using nonrulemaking dockets to ad-
dress interpretative issues, such as those arising under the forfeiture provisions, will
weaken or bolster its position in court remains uncertain, as noted below in section
III.B.4. It is likely, however, that as more ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications
are filed under the new provisions, more interpretative issues will arise, particularly
with respect to the forfeiture provisions. And at least for the time being, FDA has
indicated that it plans to continue its practice of opening nonrulemaking dockets
when facing these issues.26
In the sections that follow, the authors discuss the interpretive issues that arise
for new ANDAs and old ANDAs, focusing heavily on developments since their last
article. Section II discusses earning, maintaining, and triggering 180-day exclusivity.
Section III discusses loss of eligibility and forfeiture. In section IV, the conclusion,
the authors offer thoughts on the impact of 180-day exclusivity, topics on which
legislation has been or might be proposed, and proposals for adoption of a similar
model in a new context.
II. EARNING, MAINTAINING, AND TRIGGERING 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY
A. Earning and Maintaining Eligibility for Exclusivity
1. When must an ANDA applicant send notice of its paragraph
IV certification to the innovator in order to earn 180-day
exclusivity?
Under the old provisions, 180-day exclusivity delayed approval of an ANDA with
a paragraph IV certification if it was "for a drug for which a previous application
[had] been submitted under [section 5050) containing] such a certification." Prior
to enactment of the MMA, this was interpreted to require that the first applicant
24 For example, this observation was made by Robert A. Dormer at a FDLI conference on the Hatch-
Waxman amendments on February 5, 2009. See Robert A. Dormer, 180-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Mechanics,
FDA Decisions, andRecent Court Decisions, Presentation at FDLI's Waxman-Hatch: Back to the Future (Feb.
5, 2009) (stating that the "[t]rend of deciding on case-by-case basis often leaves it to the court to decide").
25 This comment was made by Elizabeth Dickinson at a FDLI conference. See supra note 3.
26 FDA, Decision Letter: Dorzolamide Hydrochloride/Timolol Maleate Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity,
Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0483-0001 (Oct. 28,2008), at 1; FDA, Decision Letter: Granisetron Hydrochloride
Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269)
(Jan. 17, 2008), at 1-2.
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file a substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification and comply
with both the certification and the notice provisions of section 505(j).
The pre-MMA statute was silent concerning when notice with respect to a
paragraph IV certification in an original ANDA was required to be provided to
the innovator. It stated, however, that notice regarding a paragraph IV certification
in an amended ANDA was required to be "given when the amended application
[was] submitted." FDA interpreted the timing requirement differently for amended
ANDAs and for original ANDAs. With respect to an amended ANDA, FDA
interpreted it to mean that notice was required simultaneously with the amended
ANDA. Moreover, if the first applicant violated the notice provisions by providing
notice after submitting the ANDA amendment, agency policy constructively moved
the certification's filing date-and therefore the date on which the ANDA applicant
could become eligible for 180-day exclusivity-to the day on which the applicant
mailed the notice. This policy was sustained by the D.C. Circuit as a reasonable
exercise of agency discretion.27 In the case of an original ANDA, however, the
agency referred to the certification date to determine when the applicant became
eligible for exclusivity.28 FDA's interpretation of when it considered notice to be
provided for 180-day exclusivity purposes was articulated in 2003 and 2004 and is
described in the authors' 2007 article.
Although Congress reworded the 180-day exclusivity provisions in 2003 and also
amended the notice of certification provisions to specify the timing of providing
such notice to the innovator, neither change affects the underlying requirement
that the first applicant file a substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification and comply with both the certification and the notice provisions of
section 505(j) to be eligible for 180-day exclusivity. Under the new provisions, 180-
day exclusivity delays approval of an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification if
that application is for "a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an applica-
tion containing such a certification" (i.e., a drug for which someone else submitted
an ANDA earning it eligibility for exclusivity). Congress also amended the notice
provision to specify that a paragraph IV notice must be provided, in the case of
an original ANDA, no later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the
27 See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004), aff'g, TorPharm, Inc. v.
Thompson, 260 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003) (addressing FDA's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)
and 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(d)).
28 This became clear in a matter involving an ANDA filed in July 2002 by Purepac, seeking to market
a generic version ofGlucophage XR (metformin hydrochloride extended release). On November 5, 2002, the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a new patent claiming metformin hydrochloride. The patent was
listed in the Orange Book on November 21. On November 5, and on every subsequent business day through
November 25, Purepac submitted a paragraph IV certification to that patent. On November 27, Purepac sent
notice of the paragraph IV certification to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), the patent holder. BMS received
that notice letter on December 3. IVAX filed an original ANDA after Purepac amended its ANDA, but before
Purepac sent notice to BMS. IVAX included a paragraph IV certification to the second patent and notified
BMS at that time. FDA awarded exclusivity to IVAX and not to Purepac, reasoning that the controlling dates
for determination of first applicant status were Purepac's notice date (because Purepac was amending its
ANDA) and IVAX's certification date (because [VAX was filing an original ANDA). Purepac filed a lawsuit
against FDA, challenging the agency's award of exclusivity to IVAX. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson,
No. 03-cv-02210 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2003) (complaint). WAX intervened as a defendant. Purepac and IVAX
subsequently settled the lawsuit by agreeing to share profits during the exclusivity period. See IVAX Purepac
Settle Metformin 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Suit, FDA WEEK (Dec. 5, 2003); Glucophage XR Settle-
ment: Purepac, IVAXSplit Generic Profits for 180 Days, HEALTH NEWS DAILY (Nov. 28, 2003). Consequently,
the judge dismissed the case on November 26. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, No. 03-cv-02210 (D.D.C.
Nov. 26, 2003) (consent order to dissolve temporary restraining order and stipulation of dismissal).
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notice from FDA that the ANDA has been filed.2 9 Congress did not change the
statutory language stating that in the case of an ANDA amendment, notice of a
paragraph IV certification must be provided when the generic applicant submits
the amendment in question.30
As noted in the authors' 2007 article, IVAX and Mylan have argued that the change
to the notice provision for original ANDAs signaled Congress's intent that the notice
date should control in all cases, i.e., that the certification date should not control
for purposes of eligibility for exclusivity with respect to either original or amended
ANDAs. Both IVAX and Mylan submitted amendments containing paragraph IV
certifications to their previously submitted ANDAs and contemporaneously sent
notice to the NDA holders. Eon (in the IVAX matter) and Dr. Reddy's (in the Mylan
matter) filed their original ANDAs containing paragraph IV certifications prior to
the submission of IVAX and Mylan's amendments. Eon and Dr. Reddy's did not,
however, submit their notices until after IVAX and Mylan submitted theirs. IVAX
and Mylan asserted in separate petitions that the change in notice requirements in
the MMA meant that to be eligible for 180-day exclusivity, the first applicant must
submit a paragraph IV certification and satisfy the notice requirement, regardless of
whether the certification was made in the original ANDA or an amendment to the
ANDA.31 IVAX withdrew its petition on September 15, 2006, and FDA approved the
ANDA submitted by Eon (now known as Sandoz) on December 21, 2006.32 In the
Mylan matter, the district court upheld the validity and enforceability of the patent
at issue and enjoined both Mylan and Dr. Reddy's from selling their generic products.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision in the patent infringement
litigation on May 11, 2007, 3 and denied a petition by Mylan for panel rehearing
and rehearing en banc on June 19, 200 7 .-' Mylan's citizen petition was subsequently
withdrawn, presumably because it was no longer eligible for 180-day exclusivity in
light of its unsuccessful patent challenge." Although FDA did not respond to either
petition, the agency apparently disagreed with the IVAX and Mylan interpretation
of the effect of the changes to the notice requirement, because it awarded 180-day
exclusivity to Eon in the IVAX matter.3 6
2. Can more than one first applicant hold exclusivity with respect
to one innovator drug?
The issues of "multiple" and "shared" exclusivity can arise in three situations:
1) where multiple applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications to
different listed patents for the same innovator drug product; 2) where multiple
29 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(1).
30 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
11 IVAX, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0520 (Nov. 19, 2004) (withdrawn); Mylan Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2006P-0245 (June 12, 2006) (withdrawn).
32 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Sandoz, Inc. (Dec. 21,
2006).
33 Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v Mylan Pharms., Inc., 223 Fed. Appx. 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpub-
lished), aff'g, 456 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 2006).
34 Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., Nos. 2007-1021, 2007-1055, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16041 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 2007).
35 Mylan's letter, dated June 27, 2007, does not provide an explanation for its withdrawal of the citizen
petition. The date of the letter suggests, however, that Mylan withdrew its petition in response to the Federal
Circuit's June 19 decision.
36 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Sandoz, Inc. (Dec. 21,
2006).
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applicants submit ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications to the same patent or
patents on the same first day; and 3) where multiple applicants submit ANDAs
with paragraph IV certifications for different dosage forms or strengths of the same
innovator drug. For old ANDAs, all three situations can result in more than one
generic applicant holding 180-day exclusivity relating to a particular active ingre-
dient. In particular, in the first situation, FDA interprets the statute as permitting
patent-by-patent exclusivity, which can create multiple exclusivity periods for a
product. Since the authors' last article, an appellate court has affirmed a decision
finding this interpretation permissible. For new ANDAs, the first situation no longer
leads to multiple exclusivity. In 2003, Congress provided that exclusivity should be
awarded product by product, rather than patent by patent. The second and third
situations can still lead to shared exclusivity.
a. Different listed patents.
In the late 1990s, FDA responded to two citizen petitions, stating that generic
applicants who certify to different patents covering the same listed drug may hold
exclusivity simultaneously.37 American Pharmaceutical Partners (APP) and Pharm-
achemie had each requested that FDA stay approval of any ANDA other than its
own for a generic version of Platinol-AQ (cisplatin injection). Pharmachemie had
filed the first substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to
one patent listed for the product. The patent holder did not file suit, and the patent
expired. APP had filed the first substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification to a different patent listed for the product. Pharmachemie then did the
same thing. Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) filed suit against both companies, and
each argued that it had been the first to file a paragraph IV certification for the
drug. FDA defined the controversy as "whether multiple ANDA applicants each
can be eligible for 180-day exclusivity because each applicant was the first to file a
paragraph IV certification as to a different patent for the listed drug." The agency
concluded that both applicants could be entitled to exclusivity. FDA stated that its
regulations "direct that the inquiry is whether one or more substantially complete
ANDAs were submitted that contained a certification that the same patent was
invalid, not enforceable, or would not be infringed." Therefore, the agency wrote,
"eligibility for exclusivity is to be determined on a patent-by-patent basis."3
Three subsequent court cases addressed FDA's view that eligibility for exclusiv-
ity was to be determined on a patent-by-patent basis. These cases were discussed
in the authors' 2007 article. Two judges on the District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled differently on the issue: one rejected the agency's approach and
reversed the Agency in a case involving paroxetine,39 and one found the agency's
31 FDA, Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, Docket No. 1999P-1271 (Aug. 2,
1999), at 4-5.
11 FDA granted exclusivity only to APP, however, reasoning that Pharmachemie's exclusivity had ter-
minated automatically when the patent for which Pharmachemie had submitted its paragraph IV certification
expired. As noted in the 2007 article, FDA also addressed shared and multiple exclusivity in draft regulations
published in 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873 (Aug. 6, 1999). Among other things, it proposed that exclusivity
would be awarded product by product rather than patent by patent. The agency withdrew the proposal in
2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 66,593 (Nov. 1, 2002).
39 TorPharm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 03-cv-2401, 2004 WL 64064 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2004) (written order me-
morializing oral order and judgment issued on Jan. 2). FDA appealed. Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, No. 03-cv-2401
(D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2004) (notice of appeal). The contested exclusivity period expired on March 6, 2004, and on
December 17, 2004, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. Apotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 04-5046 (D.C.
Cir, Dec. 17, 2004) (judgment).
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approach reasonable in a case involving gabapentin. 4' The issue has now been
resolved in FDA's favor by the D.C. Circuit in a third case.
The D.C. Circuit case in question involved ANDAs for 40 mg versions of As-
traZeneca's Prilosec (omeprazole). As the authors explained in 2007, the situation
involved 11 listed patents and four generic applicants. FDA granted Andrx 180-day
exclusivity on the basis that it was the first to file an ANDA for 40 mg omeprazole
and to challenge six of the seven originally listed patents, only three of which were
at issue in the exclusivity litigation. AstraZeneca brought suit against Andrx and
other generic applicants for infringement of these three patents. Although the court
found Andrx infringed two of the three patents at issue,41 it granted summary judg-
ment in favor of two of the other generic applicants on the third patent, holding it
not infringed. 42 Accordingly, FDA could not make approval of the Andrx ANDA
effective until expiry of the two infringed patents (and a pediatric exclusivity period)
in October 2007. In addition, the ruling of non-infringement on the third patent
triggered Andrx's 180-day exclusivity term with respect to that patent.
Andrx was also the first to challenge, in an amendment to its ANDA, four other
patents listed by AstraZeneca after its original ANDA was submitted, making it
eligible for a second exclusivity period under FDA's patent-by-patent approach.
This exclusivity would begin to run when Andrx started commercial marketing-as
noted, no earlier than October 2007. Apotex also filed an ANDA for the 40 mg
strength, and it included paragraph IV certifications to, among others, the two
patents that Andrx was found to infringe. Apotex then received tentative approval,
but because of the second 180-day exclusivity term that Andrx would enjoy in 2007
(assuming FDA made its ANDA approval effective then), the soonest Apotex could
enter the market with the 40 mg strength was April 2008.
Apotex brought suit against FDA, challenging the agency's patent-by-patent ap-
proach. The district court found section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) ambiguous with respect to
how many exclusivity periods may arise in connection with a single drug product,
and it found FDA's patent-based approach "not entirely irrational." 43 Under the
highly deferential standard of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,44 therefore, the judge granted the agency's motion for summary
judgment, thus upholding its patent-based approach. In February 2007, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed. 45 Andrx's ANDA, which was acquired by Watson, was approved
on May 30, 2008, and it was awarded a period of 180-day exclusivity with respect
to the 40 mg strength. 46 For old ANDAs, therefore, 180-day exclusivity is awarded
on a patent-by-patent basis.
40 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 04-cv-00605 (D.D.C. June 3, 2004) (order); see Court Split on FDA s Pat-
ent-by-Patent Approach to 180-Day Exclusivity, FDA WEEK (June 11, 2004). The D.C. Circuit, however,
concluded that resjudicata barred Apotex from bringing suit and vacated the lower court's holding on the
merits. Apotex v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The case giving rise to resjudicata was TorPharm,
Inc. v. Thompson, 260 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003), which involved the same parties and the same ANDAs.
That litigation related to FDA's decision to postpone the effective date of Purepac's certification to the second
patent (rather than nullify it as TorPharm had argued).
"' See In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 222 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 84 Fed. Appx.
76 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2003) (unpublished).
42 SeeApotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 05-cv-00125, 2005 WL 3568927, at 10 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005) (com-
plaint).
13 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 414 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2006).
- 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 226 Fed. Appx. 4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2007) (unpublished).
46 Press Release, Watson, Watson Receives Final Approval of Omeprazole Delayed-Release Capsules
(June 2,2008), available at http://ir.watson.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=irol-newsArticle&ID = 16109
0&higblight - .
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With respect to new ANDAs, however, Congress established one 180-day exclu-
sivity period per reference product. The new language precludes approval of an
ANDA for 180 days after first commercial marketing by "any" first applicant.47
A "first applicant" is "an applicant that, on the first day on which a substantially
complete application containing a [paragraph IV certification] is submitted for ap-
proval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains and
lawfully maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for the drug. 48 The provision also
notes that if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity, "no applicant shall be eligible,"
which would be inconsistent with a patent-by-patent approach.4 1
b. Same patents, same day.
In August 2000, Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals petitioned FDA for a deter-
mination that "all [ANDAs] containing a paragraph IV certification delivered to
FDA's Office of Generic Drugs (OGD) on the same business day are submitted at
the same time for 180-day exclusivity purposes," each receiving 180-day exclusivity
without being subject to the other's exclusivity.5 0 In an accompanying petition, Zenith
Goldline sought a stay of approval of a competitor's ANDA for alendronate sodium
tablets-marketed by the innovator as Fosamax-until its own ANDA received ap-
proval." On May 13, 2003, Ranbaxy Laboratories submitted a citizen petition making
the same request with respect to generic versions of Provigil (modafinil).52
In July 2003, FDA issued a guidance document that permitted shared exclusiv-
ity in this situation and wrote both petitioners to explain that the guidance "es-
sentially" granted their citizen petitions.13 The agency explained that when, on the
same day, more than one applicant submits an ANDA for the same drug contain-
ing a paragraph IV certification to a listed patent, and no such certification to the
same patent was submitted previously, all the applicants will share exclusivity. The
180-day exclusivity would be triggered for all first applicants for a specific listed
patent when one of them began to market its product (or on the date of any court
decision finding that patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, if earlier).
The commercial marketing trigger would begin the 180-day exclusivity period as
to all listed patents; a relevant court decision would trigger it only as to patents
addressed in the decision.
The 2003 statutory language more clearly provides that when, on the same day,
more than one applicant submits an ANDA for the same drug containing a para-
graph IV certification to a listed patent, and no such certification was submitted
previously, all the applicants will share exclusivity. As noted above, it precludes
approval for 180 days after first commercial marketing by "any" first applicant5 4
47 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
48 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).
49 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)(lI); see also 149 Cong. Rec. 31,783 (2003) (Sen. Kennedy) ("The Hatch-
Waxman provisions in this bill also make the exclusivity available only with respect to the patent or patents
challenged on the first day generic applicants challenge brand drug patents, which makes the exclusivity a
product-by-product exclusivity rather than a patent-by-patent exclusivity.")
5o Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2000P- 1445 (Aug. 8, 2000).
5' Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. 2000P-1443 (Aug. 8,
2000).
52 Ranbaxy Laboratories, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2003P-0217 (May 13, 2003).
13 FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Exclusivity When Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the
Same Day (July 2003); FDA, Letter to IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket Nos. 2000P-1443 and 2000P-
1445 (July 31, 2003); FDA, Letter to Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti LLP, Docket No. 2003P-0217
(July 31, 2003).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(vi)(I).
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and precludes rollover if "all first applicants" forfeit their exclusivity.5 It further
clarifies who qualifies as a "first applicant" by adding a definition for the term,
as discussed above in section I. B. Because Congress eliminated the court decision
trigger, exclusivity will be triggered for all first applicants when one of them begins
to market its product.
c. Different dosage forms or strengths.
In a 1999 decision involving generic copies of Zantac (ranitidine hydrochloride),
the D.C. Circuit resolved in the affirmative the question whether applicants who
market different dosages of a drug are eligible for separate 180-day exclusivity
periods. Among the ranitidine hydrochloride products sold by Glaxo as Zantac
were 150 mg and 300 mg tablets, both prescription drug products intended for the
treatment of ulcers, and 75 mg tablets, sold over the counter (OTC) for the treatment
of heartburn. Genpharm was the first to file an ANDA for the 150 mg and 300 mg
tablets, and its exclusivity ran in 1997. FDA had since approved additional ANDAs
for those strengths. Novopharm was the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification for a 75 mg OTC product and claimed it was therefore eligible for
180-day exclusivity. Apotex sought immediate approval of its own 75 mg tablets,
however, on the theory that FDA may not grant separate exclusivity periods for
ANDAs that concern patents listed with respect to previously approved drugs of
different strengths. The district court disagreed, holding that permitting separate
exclusivity periods for separate drug strengths is consistent with the statute, which
requires that an ANDA contain, among other things, "information to show that
the 'route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug
are the same as those of the listed drug."'56 For similar reasons, generic copies of
tablet forms and capsule forms of the same drug are eligible for separate 180-day
exclusivity periods. 7
Although FDA has not addressed this issue with respect to new ANDAs, the
requirement that exclusivity for new ANDAs be awarded product by product should
lead to the same result."
3. What does it mean to "lawfully maintain" a paragraph IV
certification?
As noted above, for new ANDAs, the term "first applicant" means "an applicant
that, on the first day on which a substantially complete application containing a
55 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity, "no applicant shall be eli-
gible").
56 Apotex, Inc. v. Shalala, 53 F. Supp. 2d 454, 456 (D.D.C. 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis added
by the district court), aff'd, No. 99-5231, 1999 WL 956686 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 1999).
11 See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000) ("The tablet and
capsule forms of the drug, however, are distinct products for FDCA purposes and are thus each eligible for
their own exclusivity.")
51 For example, in April 2004, Teva became the first applicant to submit an ANDA containing a paragraph
IV certification to market generic Actonel (risedronate sodium) tablets in 5 mg, 30 mg, and 35 mg strengths.
Teva's ANDA was granted approval on October 5, 2007, and it obtained 180-day exclusivity with respect
to each strength according to the approval letter. FDA's list of paragraph IV certifications indicates that on
September 10, 2007, the first substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification was filed for
Actonel (risedronate sodium) tablets in the 75 mg strength. And on August 12, 2008, the first substantially
complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for Actonel (risedronate sodium) tablets in the 150 mg
strength was filed. Assuming these applicants do not forfeit exclusivity, if FDA continues the same policy
as for the earlier applications for different strengths, they will presumably obtain 180-day exclusivity with
respect to these other two strengths of this product.
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[paragraph IV certification] is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a sub-
stantially complete application that contains and lawfully maintains a [paragraph
IV certification] for the drug."
Consequently, a new ANDA applicant that has first filer status cannot maintain
its eligibility for 180-day exclusivity if it does not "lawfully maintain" its paragraph
IV certification. One cannot "lawfully maintain" a patent challenge if one loses
the ensuing litigation. 9 Thus, if an ANDA applicant loses a patent challenge (for
example, to a drug substance patent), that patent challenge no longer qualifies the
applicant for exclusivity. Moreover, the 75-day forfeiture clock begins to run as
soon as the eligible applicant prevails on a different patent. Put another way, if the
ANDA applicant challenges a formulation patent but adds a frivolous challenge
to a drug substance patent, prevails on the formulation patent and loses on the
substance patent, then the 75-day clock will begin to run. The generic applicant
will forfeit exclusivity, if it cannot market within 75 days of the appellate decision
on a patent it successfully challenged. 61
4. Are 180-day exclusivity rights waiveable?
There have been no new developments with respect to this issue since the authors'
last article. FDA developed a policy that the first filer may relinquish its exclusiv-
ity altogether at any time and may waive its 180-day exclusivity rights in favor of
another specific generic applicant after exclusivity is triggered (meaning that the
180 days are running). Congress did not address this issue in 2003, and presumably
this continues to be agency policy. Under the new provisions, exclusivity is triggered
only by commercial marketing. It follows then that the first generic must launch
its product before it can waive the exclusivity in favor of another applicant (also
known as a "selective waiver").
In a 1997 case relating to generic copies of Zantac (ranitidine hydrochloride), a
federal district court rejected a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO),
after FDA approved an ANDA filed by a second applicant who had purchased 180-
day exclusivity from the first applicant.6' The court noted that the Hatch-Waxman
amendments are silent on the question of waiver of 180-day exclusivity, and FDA
pointed to other instances where the agency had approved waivers with respect to
five-year and three-year exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman amendments. The
court concluded that FDA's interpretation of the statute was not based on an im-
permissible construction of the statute, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and
was not an abuse of discretion. It therefore denied emergency relief.
In proposed regulations published in 1999, FDA restated its position that 180-
day exclusivity rights may be waived.62 Under one part of this proposal, once a
subsequent generic applicant received tentative approval for its generic drug from
FDA (such that the exclusivity was the only obstacle to final approval), a trigger-
ing period would begin to run. Within 180 days, one of the two triggering events
'9 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A) ("An applicant who has submitted a [paragraph IV certification]
and is sued for patent infringement within 45 days of the receipt of notice ... shall amend the certification
[to a paragraph 1II] if a final judgment in the action against the applicant is entered finding the patent to be
infringed.")
60 As the authors explained in 2007, this precludes a generic applicant from "parking" exclusiv-
ity-blocking subsequent ANDA applicants-by challenging two patents, knowing that the company will
lose on the patent that is not due to expire for some time.
61 Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. v. Shalala, 993 F. Supp.1 (D.D.C. 1997).
62 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,881 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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for the exclusivity period to run-a favorable court decision regarding the patent
or commercial marketing by the first applicant-would need to occur, or the first
generic would lose its exclusivity. After a triggering event occurred, the first generic
would be permitted to waive its rights in favor of another company. FDA noted
that waiver can be particularly useful when a subsequent generic wins its patent suit
with the innovator before the first generic's suit goes to trial. Prior to the trigger-
ing event, however, the first generic could not waive its exclusivity rights. It could
relinquish its rights-waive its exclusivity entirely-permitting FDA to approve all
subsequent ANDAs, but it could not sell the exclusivity term to a particular generic
manufacturer. FDA withdrew its proposed regulations in 2002, but confirmed this
position two years later in response to a Pfizer citizen petition.63
On May 11, 2004, Pfizer submitted a citizen petition to FDA asking the agency
to acknowledge that 180-day exclusivity cannot lawfully be waived or transferred.64
Pfizer argued, among other things, that the plain language of the statute does
not permit waiver or transfer and that permitting exclusivity to be fully alienable
encourages ANDA applicants to file weak applications simply to vest a lucrative
asset. On July 2, 2004, the agency denied that citizen petition . 6 FDA rejected the
textual argument on the ground that section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) is ambiguous and can
reasonably be interpreted to permit waiver. Further, the agency added, the statute
confers a private benefit to specific entities, and in such situations judicial precedent
supports inferring that the agency may allow an alternative course of action more
favorable to the beneficiary. Finally, the agency noted, allowing generic applicants
to waive their exclusivity promotes competition by enabling other generic applicants
to market their products sooner.
FDXs response makes it clear that the agency continues to require a triggering
event in order to distinguish between relinquishment and selective waiver. "As to
potential 'gaming,' if the first applicant could selectively waive its exclusivity at
any time," FDA wrote, the agency "could reasonably expect the development of
a 'market' for 180-day exclusivity, with a resulting increase in ANDA's submitted
solely to claim exclusivity." FDA concluded, however, "that by permitting selective
waiver only once the exclusivity is triggered, it can prevent 'gaming' of exclusivity,
avoid unnecessary exclusivity disputes, and still maintain exclusivity as an adequate
incentive and reward."
5. Does 180-day exclusivity roll over to a subsequent applicant in
the event that the first applicant forfeits, or does not perfect, its
rights?
There have been no developments regarding this issue since the authors' 2007
article. The agency consistently took the position that exclusivity would not roll
over to a second applicant under the language applicable to old ANDAs, and the
2003 legislation explicitly rejects roll-over for new ANDAs.
Prior to 1999, there were no cases or official FDA pronouncements on the ques-
tion whether exclusivity might roll over to a second applicant. The agency did note
in 1994 that if the first applicant was "not actively pursuing approval" of its ANDA,
63 In the interim, in a 2000 case involving Hytrin (terozosin), a district court wrote that "exclusivity
periods are a transferable commodity which can be waived in favor of another generic manufacturer for a
substantial price." Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2000).
1 Pfizer, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0227 (May 11, 2004).
65 FDA, Response to Pfizer Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0227 (July 2, 2004).
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FDA would make approval of subsequent ANDAs immediately effective.66 But the
1999 proposed regulations addressed the issue directly. The agency stated that, in
order to be entitled to 180-day exclusivity, an ANDA applicant needed to be the
first to file a substantially complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.67
An ANDA was not substantially complete if FDA determined that the required
bioequivalence data failed to meet FDA standards. If FDA found the bioequiva-
lence studies to be deficient, that applicant would lose its exclusivity, and no other
applicant would be granted exclusivity. FDA noted that, as this suggests, there
would be no "rolling exclusivity." Thus, for example, if the first generic withdrew
its application or was found by a court to be infringing the patent, exclusivity would
not roll over to the next-filed ANDA. The 2003 legislation requires the same result
for new ANDAs; as noted in section I. B. if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity,
"no applicant shall be eligible."68
B. Court Decision Trigger
As discussed above, there is a court decision trigger for exclusivity only with
respect to old ANDAs. The discussion that follows is therefore primarily relevant
for the handful of products with ANDAs pending at the agency that are subject to
the old provisions. But because there is a court decision trigger for forfeiture under
the new provision, some of the agency's thinking and experience with respect to the
court decision trigger for exclusivity may be instructive for new ANDAs.
1. Must the first applicant have itself been sued for patent in-
fringement, and must it have itself prevailed in that patent in-
fringement litigation, in order to obtain the benefit of 180-day
exclusivity?
Although the agency initially concluded that a first generic would be eligible for
exclusivity only if it had been sued for patent infringement and prevailed, the D.C.
Circuit decided otherwise in 1998. For old ANDAs, there is no suit or "successful
defense" requirement. Another generic can be sued and prevail instead, triggering
the exclusivity, or the case can be dismissed. There have been no developments on
this issue since the 2007 article.
When FDA initially proposed regulations to implement 180-day exclusivity, it
stated that a generic applicant was entitled to exclusivity only when it had itself
been sued for patent infringement and prevailed in that lawsuit. It stated that to
permit otherwise "would provide a windfall to an applicant who has not devoted
the considerable time and money necessary for patent litigation."6 9 After the Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs signed the Federal Register notice of the proposed
regulations, but before publication of the proposal in the Federal Register, a federal
district court reached a contrary conclusion on the issue whether the generic ap-
plicant must have been sued, itself, by the patent holder.
In this case, involving generic copies of Inderal (propranolol hydrochloride),
the district court noted that the "alternatives are clear"-the "primary ANDA
66 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,367-50,368 (Oct. 3, 1994).
67 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,875 (Aug. 6, 1999).
68 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(D)(iii).
69 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,353 (Oct. 3, 1994).
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applicant can qualify for exclusivity beginning either on the date of a court deci-
sion invalidating a patent or holding that it is not infringed or on the date of first
commercial marketing of the applicant's product."7 "There is no ambiguity" in
the statute, the court wrote, "that requires the Court or permits the FDA to read
into it a requirement of a lawsuit which is simply not there." The agency appealed
the decision, however, and the case was dismissed as moot before FDA concluded
the rulemaking.7'
In its final regulations, published in 1994, the agency stood by its earlier posi-
tion. A generic applicant would be entitled to exclusivity only if it had successfully
defended a patent infringement suit. Neither the court decision nor the commercial
marketing trigger would apply, unless and until the first applicant won its patent
infringement suit. FDA believed that to provide otherwise would "create[] an incen-
tive for frivolous claims of patent invalidity or noninfringement."72
In 1998, the agency's position was invalidated. In December 1994, Mova filed an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to market a generic version of Micronase
(micronized glyburide), a diabetes drug marketed by Pharmacia. Pharmacia sued
Mova for infringing its patent. In November 1995, while Mova was engaged in
that litigation, Mylan filed an ANDA for the same product and eventually filed a
paragraph IV certification. Pharmacia declined to sue, and FDA approved Mylan's
application on December 19, 1996. FDA reasoned that Mova's exclusivity did not
bar approval of the Mylan ANDA, because Mova had not yet successfully defended
against Pharmacia's suit. Mova then brought suit to compel FDA to delay the ef-
fective date of its approval of Mylan's product until 180 days after the earlier of
the date Mova won its lawsuit or the date it began to market its product. Mova
challenged the successful defense regulation as contrary to the plain language of
the statute. The district court found that Mova had a very high likelihood of success
on the merits of its claim and granted a preliminary injunction.7 3
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that holding.74 Although FDA argued that its
successful defense requirement furthered the intent of Congress, the court disagreed.
The successful defense requirement, the court wrote, is "gravely inconsistent with
the text and structure of the statute." The D.C. Circuit explained, "[t]he commer-
cial-marketing trigger seems intended to insure that, if a first ANDA applicant
chooses to begin marketing its product before it has won its patent-infringement
suit, the 180-day exclusivity period will begin to run immediately. Under the FDAs
regulation, however, the 180-day exclusivity period is only available to an applicant
who has already 'successfully defended against a suit for patent infringement."' Its
practical effect, the court wrote, is "to write the commercial-marketing trigger out
of the statute."75 The court recognized the issue, raised by Mylan, that the statutory
scheme might penalize a meritorious second ANDA applicant. Nevertheless, the
70 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated as moot, No. 89-5209
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 1989).
71 Inwood asked the court of appeals to declare the case moot when six months had elapsed after the
lower court enjoined FDA from approving another ANDA. See Inwood Case May Not Set Precedent on
Exclusivity, WASH. DRUG LETrER (Oct. 30, 1989), at 2.
72 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,353 (Oct. 3, 1994).
13 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997).
14 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
75 Id. at 1069-1070. The court reasoned that "if the first applicant begins marketing its product before
it wins its infringement suit, the 180 days of exclusivity do not begin to run; other applicants remain eligible
for FDA approval to begin marketing their products, at least up to the date that the first applicant wins the
infringement action." Id. at 1070.
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court found that the successful defense requirement was too "blunt an instrument"
to address that issue. The regulation was, thus, invalid. As explained in the authors'
2007 article, the Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in an unpublished
case earlier the same year.76
Shortly after these decisions, FDA issued a guidance announcing its intent to
remove the successful defense requirement from the regulation and to issue new
regulations." In the meantime, FDA stated, it would "regulate directly from the
statute" and "make decisions on 180-day generic drug exclusivity on a case-by-
case basis." The agency would inform the first applicant to submit a substantially
complete abbreviated application with a paragraph IV certification that it was
eligible for 180 days of exclusivity even though it had not been sued for patent
infringement. In November 1998, FDA published an interim rule, eliminating the
successful defense requirement.78
Later the same year, the D.C. Circuit approved FDXs new approach, noting
that the first generic need not be sued for patent infringement to be eligible for
exclusivity. TorPharm was the first to file an ANDA for a generic version of
Ticlid (ticlopidine hydrochloride). Its ANDA contained a paragraph IV certi-
fication. The patent owner did not file suit against TorPharm. FDA tentatively
approved an ANDA filed by Purepac, but because the agency had not given final
approval to TorPharm and there was not a qualifying court decision, TorPharm's
exclusivity had not begun to run. Accordingly, FDA withheld final approval of
Purepac's ANDA pending TorPharm's final approval, commercial marketing,
and expiry of its 180-day exclusivity. Purepac sued FDA seeking an injunction
claiming that TorPharm was not entitled to exclusivity because it had not been
sued for infringement. Consistent with the Mova decision and its new guidance,
the agency responded that a suit was not required. The D.C. Circuit agreed,
concluding that FDXs revised approach was consistent with the statute and the
Mova decision, noting that the statute "does not, on its face, require the first
applicant to be sued in order to benefit from" 180-day exclusivity.79 Thus, FDA
could withhold final approval of the Purepac ANDA until TorPharm had com-
mercially marketed for 180 days.
Although there is no successful defense requirement, if the first applicant loses
the patent infringement case, it must amend its certification to a paragraph III
certification, and it is no longer eligible for exclusivity. This was made clear in a
2000 lawsuit involving the old statutory provisions and generic tamoxifen, and
presumably it also applies to new ANDAs. The Southern District of New York
had invalidated the innovator's patent, but that decision was subsequently appealed
and vacated pursuant to a settlement agreement between the innovator, Imperial
Chemical Industries, and the generic manufacturer, Barr. Also pursuant to the
settlement, Barr amended its ANDA to change from a paragraph IV to a paragraph
III certification. In addition, Barr obtained a license to market the product prior
to patent expiry. FDA declined to treat the New York decision as a "court deci-
sion" for purposes of exclusivity and instead agreed with Barr that its exclusivity
was intact. Mylan, a subsequent filer, sued FDA. The district court held that Barr
had waived its eligibility for 180-day exclusivity, explaining that once a company
changes its certification, the ANDA is no longer considered to have "contained" a
76 Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished).
" See FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA (June 1998).
11 63 Fed. Reg. 59,710 (Nov. 5, 1998).
71 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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paragraph IV certification."0 This meant Barr was no longer eligible for exclusivity,
and because FDA took the position that there was no rolling exclusivity under the
statute, the agency could approve Mylan's ANDA.
2. What kind of court decision triggers 180-day exclusivity?
In April 2006, following litigation involving generic copies of Pravachol (pravas-
tatin sodium), FDA announced a policy that the court decision trigger applicable
to old ANDAs requires a decision of a court that on its face evidences a holding on
the merits of patent non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability. Although to
the authors' knowledge the issue has not yet arisen, the agency may apply the same
policy to court decisions triggering forfeiture under the new statutory provisions.
There is no court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs.
a. Ticlid (ticlopidine) decision.
As noted above, TorPharm was the first to file an ANDA for ticlopidine hy-
drochloride, a generic version of Ticlid. Teva Pharmaceuticals filed a subsequent
ANDA, and it was not sued for patent infringement. Teva sued the patent owner,
Syntex, in the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement. As explained later by the D.C. Circuit, the California court "dis-
missed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after finding, based on
the patent holder's admission of non-infringement, that Teva lacked a reasonable
apprehension of suit by the patent holder.""1
In October 1998, FDA tentatively approved Teva's ANDA. FDA informed Teva,
however, that because there was a prior ANDA applicant and neither commercial
marketing nor a relevant court decision had occurred, Teva's application was
ineligible for final approval. Teva argued to FDA, to no avail, that the California
court's dismissal of its declaratoryjudgment suit against Syntex satisfied the "court
decision" requirement, triggering TorPharm's exclusivity. Teva then brought suit
in federal district court in the District of Columbia, seeking to have its ANDA
approved effective 180 days after the California court dismissed the declaratory
judgment suit. The district court upheld FDAs decision and denied injunctive relief.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that FDA's unexplained refusal to recognize
dismissal by the California court as the functional equivalent of a final decision
of non-infringement was arbitrary.82 The court cited several reasons in support
of its ruling, including that "[a] 'decision' can take several forms, including final
judgment after a full trial, summary judgment or partial summary judgment, or
even dismissal for failure to state a cause of action."
Following this decision, FDA provided a rationale for refusing to recognize
dismissal of Teva's declaratory judgment action as a triggering court decision.
FDA explained that generic applicants seeking to avail themselves of the court
decision trigger must submit a copy of the court decision in question. The agency
would not review any additional papers from the underlying litigation. The reason
for Teva's dismissal "was not evident from the face of the court order, [and] the
court did not issue a memorandum opinion explaining the basis for the order."
Requiring staff in the OGD to delve beyond these documents would "place an
unbearable burden" on the office. On remand, however, the district court rejected
80 See Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Henney, 94 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated and dismissed as moot,
Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
S1 Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
12 See id. at 1007-1008.
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FDA's explanation, noting-among other things-that "this is not a case where a
great deal of sophisticated legal analysis is required.
83
b. Pravachol (pravastatin sodium) decision.
In December 2000, Teva filed the first ANDA to market generic copies of
Pravachol (pravastatin sodium) in 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40 mg tablets. Teva included
a paragraph III certification for the patent on the molecule and paragraph IV
certifications for certain other listed patents. The NDA holder, BMS, did not sue
Teva or any of the other generic drug manufacturers that filed applications with
paragraph IV certifications. FDA tentatively approved Teva's ANDA (pending
expiry of the patent on the molecule) in May 2002. One of the other generic ap-
plicants, Apotex, sued BMS in October 2003, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the patents in question were invalid or not infringed by it.
In July 2004, the court entered a "stipulation and order," signed by both parties,
stating that BMS had "no intention to bring suit against Apotex for infringement.
8 4
Apotex returned to FDA, asking that it find this to be a "court decision" that trig-
gered Teva's exclusivity FDA agreed, apparently concluding that the decision in
the ticlopidine case meant any dismissal of a declaratory judgment case triggers
exclusivity.
This meant Teva's exclusivity would run before the patent expired for which Teva
had submitted a paragraph III certification, so Teva brought suit. In March 2006,
the D.C. Circuit rejected FDA's reading of the ticlopidine decision. It explained
that, in the ticlopidine case, "the court stated that the statute could be interpreted
to include dismissals of declaratory judgment actions as triggering events," but
"it left the final decision to the FDA."85 In short, the ticlodipine court had simply
found the trigger ambiguous. The agency "mistakenly thought itself bound,"
which "renders its decision arbitrary and capricious." Thus, "[w]hile the statute
may preclude treating voluntary dismissals ... as triggering events, we express no
opinion on the matter." Instead, it is "up to the agency to ... make a reasonable
policy choice," and "FDA has not yet done so."8
The agency responded to this court decision in an April 2006 letter to Apotex
and the other generic applicants, stating that "FDA interprets the court decision
trigger provision to require a decision of a court that on its face evidences a hold-
ing on the merits of patent non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability."87 In
the pravastatin case, therefore, Teva's exclusivity period had not been triggered by
the July 2004 dismissal of the Apotex litigation. Following another rush of litiga-
tion by Apotex (a request for injunction and then appeal to the D.C. Circuit),88
FDA granted Teva final approval on April 24.89 Apotex obtained final approval
six months later on October 23.
83 TevaPharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA, No. 99-cv-00067, 1999 WL 1042743, at *5 (D.D.C.Aug. 19, 1999),
aff'd, 254 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
84 Apotex Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 04-cv-02922, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004) (stipulation
and order).
85 Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. FDA, 441 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
86 Id. at 5.
" See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Pravastatin ANDA Ap-
plicant 15 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/announce/Pravastatin- I 8ODay-amend.pdf.
88 See Apotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 06-00627 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2006) (denying motions for a TRO and a
preliminary injunction); No. 06-5105 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2006) (granting emergency motion for injunctive
relief-issuing administrative injunction-pending further order of the court); No. 06-5105 (D.C. Cit. Apr.
24, 2006) (dissolving administrative injunction and denying motion for injunctive relief pending appeal); 449
F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (summarily affirming district court's refusal to grant preliminary injunction); No.
06-1505, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2006) (denying request for rehearing en banc).
89 Dana Elfin, FDA Approves Teva s Generic Pravastatin, As Court Denies Apotex Emergency Relief
4 PHA-un. LAW & INDUS. REPORT 499 (2006).
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c. Zofran (ondansetron hydrochloride) decision.
In June 2001, Dr. Reddy's became the first applicant to file an ANDA containing
paragraph IV certifications to the '789 and '658 patents claiming GlaxoSmithKline's
(GSK's) Zofran (ondansetron hydrochloride) tablets.90 GSK brought suit against
Dr. Reddy's with respect to the '789 patent.9' According to FDA, the parties sub-
sequently entered into a settlement agreement under which Dr. Reddy's agreed to
amend its certification with respect to the '789 patent from a paragraph IV to a
paragraph III and thus not market its generic product prior to December 24, 2006,
the expiration of pediatric exclusivity attached to the patent.
92
In the meantime, Apotex and Mutual filed ANDAs seeking to market ondan-
setron hydrochloride tablets and included paragraph IV certifications to the '658
patent. With respect to Mutual, GSK did not bring an infringement action within
45 days after receiving notice of Mutual's certification, and the generic applicant
filed an action against GSK to obtain a declaratory judgment of noninfringement
of the patent.93 The court noted that GSK subsequently stipulated to non-in-
fringement of the '658 patent and covenanted not to sue Mutual for infringement
of the patent, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice.94 With respect to
Apotex, GSK brought a lawsuit alleging infringement of the '658 patent.95 The
case was dismissed with prejudice after GSK stipulated to non-infringement and
covenanted not to sue Apotex for infringement.96
In separate letters to FDA, Mutual and Apotex argued that the stipulated
dismissals of their respective cases satisfied FDA's "holding-on-the-merits" policy
and thus constituted court decision triggers for purposes of starting Dr. Reddy's
180-day exclusivity." FDA denied both requests in November 2006.98 The agency
explained that in neither case did the district court resolve the dispute on the mer-
its. Consequently, the stipulated dismissals did not reflect a holding on the merits
of the patent claims at issue and thus did not satisfy FDAs court decision trigger
90 GSK listed two other patents in the Orange Book with respect to Zofran. These patents were not at
issue.
9, Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs. Ltd., No. 01-4066 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2001) (complaint).
92 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs to Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Inc.
2 (Dec. 26, 2006).
13 Mutual Pharm, Co., Inc. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., No. 03-cv-00426 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2003) (com-
plaint).
94 Mutual Pharm, Co., Inc. v. Glaxo Group Ltd.,No. 03-cv-00426 (E.D. Va. July 18,2003) (stipulation
of dismissal).
95 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No.05-307 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2005) (complaint).
96 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No.05-307 (D.N.J. May 25, 2005) (stipulation and order of dis-
missal).
91 Letter from Robert Dettery, Vice-President, Regulatory Affairs, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.,
to Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs (June 23, 2006); Letter from Christine J. Siwik
and William A. Rakoczy, Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Siwik LLP, to Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of
Generic Drugs (Aug, 29, 2006). Mutual and Apotex made similar requests in letters sent to FDA prior to
the agency's April 11, 2006 announcement of the holding-on-the-merits standard, discussed previously. See
Letter from Robert Dettery, Vice-President, Regulatory Affairs, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., to Gary
Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs (Aug. 6, 2003); Letter from Christine J. Siwik and William
A. Rakoczy, Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Siwik LLP, to Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs
(Aug, 31, 2005).
98 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Christine J. Siwik and William
A. Rakoczy, Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Siwik LLP (Nov. 3,2006); Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA
Office of Generic Drugs, to Robert Dettery, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. (Nov. 8, 2006).
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policy. Although Apotex brought suit, 99 its motion for a preliminary injunction
was denied without an opinion, and the D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed. 100
d. Medicare Modernization Act.
In 2003, Congress eliminated the court decision trigger for 180-day exclusivity.
For new ANDAs, exclusivity begins with the first commercial marketing of the
drug product by a first applicant. Although Congress eliminated the court decision
trigger for beginning the period of exclusivity, it established a new court decision
trigger for forfeiture of exclusivity. Once the first generic applicant obtains final
approval of its ANDA, its exclusivity does not begin to run until it commercially
markets. Moreover, unless another forfeiture provision applies, that exclusivity is
not forfeited until 75 days after a court decision on every patent qualifying it for
exclusivity (assuming the first prong of the failure to market provision has been
triggered). The legislative history contains a reference to the ticlopidine case, 10
suggesting that at least one member of the Senate viewed a decision dismissing
a declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
patent owner has represented that the patent is not infringed as a court decision
triggering forfeiture. But the pravastatin court questioned that reading of the
ticlodipine decision, and the agency's subsequently announced policy is more
narrow. 2 It remains to be seen whether FDA will apply the April 2006 policy to
court decisions triggering forfeiture or whether it will instead revert to its earlier
interpretation of the ticlodipine case.
3. What level of court decision triggers 180-day exclusivity?
There have been no developments in this area since the authors last wrote. The
2003 legislation addressed the issue retroactively for old ANDAs; exclusivity begins
when a decision is rendered by "a court from which no appeal (other than a petition
to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken."'0 3 There
is no court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs, but the same language
appears with respect to the court decision forfeiture event.
a. Old ANDAs.
In the preamble to its final 1994 regulations, FDA stated that the court decision
activating the court decision trigger "must be a final decision from which no appeal
can be or has been taken."' '° This was rejected in a January 2000 case involving
generic copies of Hytrin (terazosin hydrochloride). The district court rejected FDA's
position that the triggering event is "either the date that a district court decision is
99 Apotex requested that the court set aside the agency's decision, declare that the agency's refusal to
treat the dismissal order as a triggering court decision was arbitrary, and direct FDA to approve Apotex's ANDA
on December 24, 2006. Apotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 06-cv-1 890, at 2 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2006) (complaint).
"0 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 06-5408 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (order). Shortly thereafter, the parties
stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the case with prejudice. Apotex Inc. v. FDA, No. 06-cv-1890 (D.D.C.
Feb. 28, 2007) (stipulation of dismissal).
I"1 See 149 Cong. Rec. 31,783 (2003) (Sen. Kennedy) ("We do intend that a court decision like the
one in the D.C. Circuit's 1999 decision in Teva v. Shalala-a decision dismissing a declaratory judgment
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the patent owner has represented that the patent is not
infringed-will count as a court decision under the new 'failure to market' provision.").
"02 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Pravastatin ANDA Ap-
plicant 15 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/announce/Pravastatin-180Day-amend.pdf.
'03 Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b)(3), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (2003).
"o 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,354 (Oct. 3, 1994).
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affirmed by the Federal Circuit, or the date on which the time for filing an appeal
has lapsed." In other words, "decision of a court" included "the decision of a United
States district court regardless of whether that decision is appealed."'15
In March 2000, FDA issued a guidance document implementing this court deci-
sion, 106 and shortly afterwards, the agency published interim regulations amending
the definition of "court decision" to be consistent with its guidance and the terazosin
decision. 107 The agency agreed that this new interpretation could compromise com-
panies that had developed marketing strategies in reliance on the old definition of
court decision; it could put them in the position of exposing themselves to damages
if they were to market their products (to take advantage of the 180-day period) but
lose in the appeal of the patent case. The agency concluded that the new definition
of court would therefore apply only to ANDAs filed after March 30, 2000.
Congress reversed the rule in 2003, however, and this is one of two topics on
which the 2003 legislation is retroactive. Exclusivity for old ANDAs begins when
a decision is rendered by "a court from which no appeal (other than a petition to
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken."'' 8
b. New ANDAs.
There is no court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs, although (as
discussed in more detail below, see III. A. 1), there is a court decision trigger for
forfeiture of exclusivity.
4. Under what circumstances may a subsequent applicant bring
a declaratory judgment suit against the innovator or patent
holder in order to trigger the first applicant's exclusivity?
The court decision trigger for exclusivity under the old ANDA provisions was
interpreted to permit a subsequent ANDA applicant to trigger the first ANDA
applicant's 180-day exclusivity by prevailing in its own court case, clearing the way
for the subsequent applicant that triggered the exclusivity (and other applicants)
to market after expiry of the exclusivity. Where the innovator had not sued the
subsequent applicant for patent infringement on at least one of the patents for
which a paragraph IV certification was submitted, that applicant sometimes sought
the triggering court decision itself through a declaratory judgment suit against the
105 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47 (D.D.C. 2000).
106 FDA, Guidance for Industry, Court Decisions, ANDA Approvals, and 180-Day Exclusivity Under
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA (Mar. 2000). The agency stated that it would interpret the
term "court" to mean "the first court that renders a decision finding the patent at issue invalid, unenforce-
able, or not infringed." It would apply this to both 30-month stays and 180-day exclusivity. Thus, if a district
court rendered such a decision, the 30-month stay would end for that ANDA as of the date the district court
entered its decision, and 180-day exclusivity for the first filer would also begin to run on that date (unless it
had begun already with commercial marketing). Neither a stay nor a reversal of this decision would lead to
revocation of approval of that ANDA or the first filer's 180-day exclusivity. If a district court found patent
infringement, however, and that ruling was reversed by the Federal Circuit, that generic's ANDA would be
approved, and the 180-day exclusivity would start "on the date the district court issues a judgment that the
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed pursuant to a mandate issued by a court of appeals."
0 65 Fed. Reg. 43,233 (July 13, 2000).
08 Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b)(3), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (2003). By way of contrast, Congress pro-
vided in 2003 that 30-month stays for new ANDAs would end with a district court decision. Thus, district
court decisions will end 30-month stays but not trigger the running of 180-day exclusivity. If the 30-month
stay ends, however, and FDA approves the ANDA, any commercial marketing under the ANDA will trigger
180-day exclusivity for old ANDAs or new ANDAs.
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innovator. 0 9 And although there is no court decision trigger for exclusivity under
the new provisions, there is a court decision trigger for forfeiture, which has led
subsequent ANDA applicants similarly to seek declaratory judgment to cause
forfeiture of the exclusivity that is blocking them from the market."' Although
the authors did not discuss this issue in the last article, there have been significant
developments on the question whether and when an ANDA applicant that has
not itself been sued with respect to all of the challenged patents can satisfy the
constitutional "case or controversy" requirement in order to bring a declaratory
judgment case in federal court. The issue continues to play out in the lower courts
in cases brought by applicants seeking to trigger forfeiture, so it is worth a short
mention in this article.
Prior to January 2007, courts determining whether there was jurisdiction to hear
a declaratory judgment action concerning a patent applied the Federal Circuit's
"reasonable apprehension of suit" test to determine whether a declaratory judg-
ment plaintiff satisfied the case or controversy requirement."' The reasonable ap-
prehension of suit test required that a party seeking declaratory relief establish an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee, creating a reasonable apprehension
on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it would face an infringement
suit."2 Applying this test, courts generally took the position that in the absence of
some overt action demonstrating a willingness on the part of the patent owner to
enforce its patent, an ANDA applicant had no reasonable apprehension of suit
and, consequently, could not bring a declaratory judgment action." 3
In January 2007, the Supreme Court addressed declaratory judgment standards
in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc." 4 This case involved an appeal by a patent
licensee, who was seeking "a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent
[was] invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed" while it continued to pay royalties
to the patent licensor. The Supreme Court held that Article III of the Constitution
does not require a patent licensee to breach its license agreement in order to file a
declaratory judgment action regarding noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforce-
ability."5 In arriving at its decision, the Court reaffirmed that a plaintiff seeking a
declaratory judgment must satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement," 6
and, in a footnote, it criticized the reasonable apprehension of suit test developed
1o See, for example, the ticlopidine matter discussed in section II. B. 2. a. and the pravastatin matter
discussed in section II. B. 2. b.
110 The failure to market forfeiture provision provides that a declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-
infringement from which no appeal has been or can be taken will satisfy the second prong of this provision.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(l)(bb)(AA).
" The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of district court decisions relating to civil
actions arising under any federal law relating to patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) ("The United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal from a final decision
of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338 of [title 35 of the U.S. Code] .... "). Section 1338 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents ... " 21 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a).
'12 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rehear 'g
denied and rehear 'g en bane denied, No. 06-1181, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16048 (Fed. Cir. June 20, 2007).
The requirement for a reasonable apprehension of suit was part of a two-prong test formulated by the Federal
Circuit to determine if an actual controversy existed in declaratory judgment actions. The other prong required
present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity. Id.
"I See, e.g., Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd. v. Pfizer Inc., No. 0 3-cv- 7 26 , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351, at
14-15 (D. N.J. July 8, 2003) ("The objective actions of the patentee must rise 'to a level sufficient to indicate
an intent to enforce its patent', i.e., to initiate an infringement action.") (citation omitted) (unpublished).
14 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
"I Id. at 137.
116 Id. at 126-27.
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by the Federal Circuit."7 The Supreme Court instead directed courts to determine
"whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a sub-
stantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.""8
Subsequent to the MedImmune decision, the Federal Circuit put aside the rea-
sonable apprehension of suit test for cases seeking declaratory judgment to trigger
180-day exclusivity or forfeiture, concluding that MedImmune requires instead an
all-of-the-circumstances test. 119 Five cases have been decided by the Federal Circuit
under the new standard, to date, and in two of the five the declaratory judgment
suit was permitted to proceed. 20 The other three cases were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. 2 The outcome of these cases appears to be very fact-specific, as one
would expect from an all-the-circumstances test. At this point, it does not seem
possible to draw out general rules or list a series of factors that indisputably would,
or would not, give rise to jurisdiction. That said, it is clear that there have been
circumstances in which courts have found federal court jurisdiction even where the
NDA holder has provided a covenant not to sue the generic applicant seeking relief
It is therefore possible that more generic applicants will seek declaratory judgments
of patent invalidity or noninfringement when the patent owner or NDA holder
does not sue the applicant on at least one of the challenged patents. 22
C. Commercial Marketing Trigger
1. Will marketing by the first applicant of the innovator's product un-
der a private generic label satisfy the commercial marketing trigger?
Any commercial marketing by the first generic applicant, including commercial
marketing of an "authorized generic," discussed below in section IV. B. 1., will trig-
117 Id. at 132 n.il.
118 Id. at 127.
19 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Teva filed
an ANDA with paragraph IV certifications for all five of the listed patents. Novartis, the NDA holder, sued
for patent infringement on one of five patents. Teva then brought a declaratory judgment action on the four
other patents. The district court, which issued its decision prior to MedImmune, dismissed the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction after finding no reasonable apprehension of suit. On appeal, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had "overruled" the reasonable apprehension of suit test in Medlm-
mune and thus applied an "all-of-the-circumstances" test. Id. at 1338 ("Thus, because the Supreme Court in
Med/mmune cautioned that our declaratory judgment 'reasonable-apprehension-of-suit' test 'contradict[s]'and
'conflicts' with its precedent, these Federal Circuit tests have been 'overruled by ... an intervening ... Supreme
Court decision."') (citations omitted).
12 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008), petition for rehear 'g and rehear 'g en banc
denied, No. 2007-1404, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15741 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2008) cert. denied, No. 08-624,
2009 U.S. LEXIS 1482 (Feb. 23, 2009).
121 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 2007-1362, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15014, (Fed. Cir. July
16, 2008) (unpublished); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 292 Fed. Appx. 38 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2008);
Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rehear "g denied and rehear 'g
en banc denied, No. 2008-1062, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25387 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2008), cert. denied, No.
08-959, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 2021 (2009).
22 One bill introduced in the 110th Congress regarding settlements between innovators and generic
companies would have made dismissal of an ANDA applicant's declaratory judgment action of noninfringe-
ment or invalidity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a forfeiture event. H.R. 1902, 110th Cong. (2007).
This bill would also have made the grant of a covenant not to sue a forfeiture event if the generic manufacturer
filed the covenant with FDA. A hearing was held by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the measure, and it was subsequently referred
to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Interet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee.
The bill was never reported out of committee. Similar legislation has been introduced in the I I Ith Congress,
and a hearing by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce on the bill was held on Mar. 31, 2009. H.R. 1706, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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ger exclusivity, whether the application is an old ANDA or a new ANDA. There
have been no developments with respect to this issue since the authors last wrote.
For old ANDAs, the issue was addressed in 2001 by a district court in West
Virginia. In April 1997, Mylan had submitted an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification to the 30 mg dosage of extended release nifedipine and was, therefore,
considered the first applicant. The innovator, Pfizer, sued Mylan, for infringement,
and the parties settled in February 2000. Although the settlement terms were not
made public or given to the court, the court stated that Pfizer apparently licensed
Mylan to sell a private label version of its own 30 mg, 60 mg, and 90 mg nifedipine
extended release products. Pfizer may also have permitted Mylan to market its
own 30 mg product under its own ANDA, but Mylan never did so. Mylan claimed
the settlement allowed it to maintain its paragraph IV certification, and it never
amended the paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III certification.
After the settlement, Biovail, a generic manufacturer aspiring to market nifedip-
ine, attempted without success to persuade Mylan to waive its 180-day exclusivity.
When this failed, Teva (Biovail's licensee) submitted a citizen petition to FDA ask-
ing the agency to find either: a) the Mylan ANDA was not eligible for exclusivity,
or b) any exclusivity had expired. FDA responded in February 2001, agreeing on
both grounds. The agency reasoned, first, that the settlement effectively turned
Mylan's paragraph IV certification into a paragraph III certification, and second,
that the private label sales constituted commercial marketing and triggered exclu-
sivity. Because the 180 days had expired, FDA approved Biovail's ANDA. Mylan
brought suit.
In the decision that resulted, the district court found that FDA had been unrea-
sonable on the first issue and reasonable on the second. The court was not prepared
to allow FDA unilaterally to deem the paragraph IV certification to be a paragraph
III certification, particularly since Mylan had not amended the certification in its
ANDA. But it upheld FDAs determination that the private label sales were com-
mercial marketing, and thus the 180-day period had expired. In short, the district
court held that a generic manufacturer begins commercial marketing, and thereby
starts the 180-day clock, even when it sells a private label version of the innovator's
product, rather than the product that is the subject of its ANDA. 123
For new ANDAs, Congress provided in 2003 that if an ANDA contains a
paragraph IV certification and "is for a drug for which a first applicant has sub-
mitted an application containing such a certification" (i.e., is for a drug for which
someone else submitted an ANDA earning it exclusivity) the application "shall be
made effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial
marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by
any first applicant."' 24
2. Does 180-day exclusivity, if triggered by commercial marketing
prior to a final, unappealable decision of the court, continue to
run during the pendency of a preliminary injunction prohibiting
further commercial marketing by the first applicant?
If 180-day exclusivity is triggered by commercial marketing prior to a final, unap-
pealable decision of the court, and the innovator subsequently obtains a preliminary
123 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D. W.Va. 2001).
124 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
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injunction prohibiting further commercial marketing by the first applicant, the new
legislative language suggests that the first applicant's exclusivity continues to run,
even though it cannot market its product. This is also presumably the case for old
ANDAs. Although a case involving an old ANDA was brought, it was dismissed
without a decission in the wake of a ruling upholding the validity of the patent at
issue in a separate infringement action. The authors begin with the case involving
the old ANDA.
Apotex filed the first ANDA to market a generic version of Plavix (clopidogrel
bisulfate). The ANDA included a paragraph IV certification challenging the valid-
ity of one of two listed patents for Plavix. Sanofi-Synthelabo, the maker of Plavix,
sued Apotex for patent infringement in a district court in New York. 25 The 30-
month stay triggered by the lawsuit expired, and FDA approved Apotex's ANDA
on January 20, 2006. Apotex began to commercially market its product on August
8, 2006, thus triggering its 180-day exclusivity. On August 31, the district court
preliminarily enjoined Apotex from selling clopidogrel bisulfate pending a final
decision on the merits. 26 After a bench trial in early 2007, the district court upheld
the validity of the patent in question and entered a permanent injunction against
further infringement of the patent by Apotex.' 21 At the end of 2008, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the New York district court's finding of validity with respect to
the patent at issue. 28 Apotex's petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc
was denied on March 26, 2009.
In the meantime, several generic manufacturers submitted ANDAs with para-
graph IV certifications, and Sanofi sued each. FDA gave final approval to Dr.
Reddy's ANDA on January 14, 2008. Patent litigation is still pending against Dr.
Reddy's, 129 however, and apparently the company has not begun to market its ap-
proved product. Apotex, which had begun its 180-day exclusivity and, as noted, is
now enjoined from further marketing, petitioned the agency to stay the effective
date of final approval of Dr. Reddy's ANDA (and any other pending ANDA for
clopidogrel bisulfate with a paragraph IV certification for the patent in question)
until the earlier of: a) 156 days after the injunction barring Apotex from marketing
clopidogrel bisulfate was lifted or b) expiry of the patent at issue. 30
In essence, Apotex argued that the statute governing old ANDAs does not re-
quire FDA to approve a subsequent application on the 181 st day after commercial
marketing begins. Instead, a subsequent applicant's ANDA "shall be made effec-
tive not earlier than one hundred eighty days after" the date the Secretary receives
notice from the first filer of commercial marketing. 3' This, Apotex argued, gives
FDA discretion to delay the effective date of approval of ANDAs submitted by
subsequent filers. Apotex further contended that by granting it the balance of its
2 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., No. 02-cv-2255 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2002).
'26 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317,350 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 470 F.3d 1368,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rehear 'g and rehear "g en banc denied, No. 2006-1613, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2807
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 19, 2007).
127 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356, 397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
128 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
129 On January 24, 2008, Dr. Reddy's and Sanofi stipulated that Dr. Reddy's will provide Sanofi with at
least 10 business days notice before it begins to manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States
or import into the United States any product claiming the patent at issue. If the Federal Circuit enters a final
judgment holding claim #3 of the patent at issue invalid, however, Dr. Reddy's will not be required to give
notice. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., No. 02-cv-3672 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2008) (stipulation
and order).
"I Apotex, Inc., Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-0 17 (Feb. 13, 2008) (pend-
... See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv) (1984) (amended 2003)(emphasis added).
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180-day exclusivity if it succeeded on its patent challenge, FDA would best serve
Congress's intent to promote competition in the drug marketplace and create
meaningful economic incentives to encourage patent challenges. Apotex followed
this petition with a lawsuit against FDA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 32
FDA successfully moved for an extension of time to answer Apotex's complaint
on four occasions, citing the Federal Circuit's decision on the underlying patent
litigation. Because Apotex's petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc
was denied, it has lost its patent challenge and its eligibility for 180-day exclusivity
is no longer at issue.'33 As a result, Apotex's lawsuit against FDA was voluntarily
dismissed on April 15, 2009.13' In addition, Apotex's petition, which remains un-
answered, should be considered moot.
For new ANDAs, the exclusivity period is calculated from the date of the first
commercial marketing of the drug product by a first applicant. The provision
on which Apotex relied in its case, however, was amended by Congress. Section
505(j)(5)(B)(iv) now states that a subsequent application "shall be made effective
on the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing" of the
first generic product.'35 Whatever the merits of Apotex's argument regarding old
ANDAs, its reasoning appears to be inapplicable to new ANDAs. It seems that
once triggered, exclusivity runs, even if the holder of the exclusivity is enjoined
from marketing its product.
3. Do 180-day exclusivity and pediatric exclusivity run concur-
rently or consecutively?
The relationship between 180-day exclusivity and pediatric exclusivity was an issue
for old ANDAs, because the court decision trigger and the agency's patent-by-patent
approach to exclusivity meant that a first generic's exclusivity could be triggered by a
court decision during the innovator's pediatric exclusivity term. As noted in the 2007
article, the issue arose in the context of a situation in which there were different rulings
on two patents, with one patent being upheld, to which the pediatric exclusivity would
be applied. Although FDA requested comment on the issue in 2001136 and seemed
poised to find that the terms overlapped, 3 7 the issue was never addressed by a court.
Congress confirmed in the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) that if
an innovator earns six months of pediatric exclusivity, the first generic applicant's
ANDA is approved effective the first day after conclusion of that exclusivity, and the
180 days begin to run at that point. The terms are consecutive. 3 '
As noted above, 180-day exclusivity for new ANDAs is awarded on a product-
by-product basis, and there is no court decision trigger for exclusivity. Accordingly,
the statutory structure may eliminate the ability of a subsequent filer to trigger a
first filer's exclusivity during the innovator's pediatric exclusivity term. There is,
however, a court decision trigger for forfeiture and, accordingly, a new question
132 Apotex Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 08-cv-00693 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2008) (complaint).
133 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A).
134 Apotex Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08-cv-00693 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009)(notice of voluntary dismissal
without prejudice).
135 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1) (emphasis added).
136 66 Fed. Reg. 27,983 (May 21, 2001).
117 See the discussion in 2007 of Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 222 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
'31 Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002). Section 505A(k) of the FDCA, now section 505A(m),
states that if the 180-day exclusivity period "overlaps" with a 6-month pediatric exclusivity period, such that
the first generic applicant loses a portion of the 180-day period to which it is entitled, the 180-day period is
extended by the number of days of overlap.
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whether the failure to market clock is tolled during pediatric exclusivity. At the end
of 2008, a district court in the District of Columbia rejected the argument that the
forfeiture clock is tolled. The case is discussed in more detail below (see section III.
A. 3. b. ii.), but the relevant facts are as follows.
Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. was the first applicant to submit a substantially com-
plete ANDA for a generic version of Cosopt (dorzolamide hydrochloride/timolol
maleate). One of the listed patents expired on April 28, 2008, but had a period of
pediatric exclusivity until October 28, 2008. The other listed patents were due to
expire later. Hi-Tech submitted paragraph IV certifications for all listed patents,
but the NDA holder, Merck, sued only for infringement of the patent set to expire
on April 28, 2008. It disclaimed the other patents and asked that they be delisted.
Merck prevailed in its patent case, and Hi-Tech was enjoined from selling generic
Cosopt products. The court also ordered that the effective date of approval of the
Hi-Tech ANDA be no earlier than October 28, 2008.
Forfeiture became an issue because one patent expired in April 2008 (although
subject to pediatric exclusivity), and two patents were to be delisted. Among other
things, Hi-Tech argued that it had no legal right to market prior to expiration of
pediatric exclusivity, so it could not be deemed to have forfeited on the basis of
failure to market. In other words, it argued that under the BPCA, the forfeiture
clock is tolled during the pediatric exclusivity term. The court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that under the BPCA, tolling occurs only if pediatric exclusivity
"overlaps" with the 180-day exclusivity period. The court agreed with FDA that
there was no overlap in Hi-Tech's case because under the post-MMA provisions (i.e.
product-by-product exclusivity and no court decision trigger), pediatric exclusivity
and 180-day exclusivity cannot overlap.'39
III. Loss OF ELIGIBILITY AND FORFEITURE
A. General Rules
1. How does the court decision forfeiture trigger work?
The court decision trigger for forfeiture states that 180-day exclusivity is forfeited
if the applicant fails to market 75 days after, as to each patent at issue, "a court
enters a final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid
or not infringed"-unless 75 days have not elapsed since the ANDA approval was
effective and 30 months have not elapsed since the ANDA was submitted. Put an-
other way, forfeiture occurs if: 1) every patent as to which the first applicant filed a
paragraph IV certification has been declared invalid or not infringed in a final court
decision, and 75 days have elapsed since the last such decision; and 2) 30 months
have elapsed since the ANDA was submitted or FDA has granted final approval
to the ANDA, and 75 days have elapsed since that approval was effective.
There have been no petitions or, to the authors' knowledge, court cases involving
interpretation of this forfeiture provision, and they think that agency interpretations
of the court decision trigger for exclusivity may apply Thus, for example, the agency
may interpret the court decision trigger for forfeiture to require "a decision of a
court that on its face evidences a holding on the merits of patent noninfringement,
139 Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FDA, 587 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2008).
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invalidity, or unenforceability.' ' 14° This would be consistent with the position it an-
nounced in the pravastatin matter regarding court decisions triggering exclusivity
(see section II. B. 2. b.)
2. What is the effect of patent expiry once a paragraph IV certifi-
cation has been submitted?
When the authors last wrote, it was clear that if a patent expires before the first
generic applicant has final approval of its ANDA, the applicant must amend its
certification from a paragraph IV to a paragraph II and will no longer be entitled
to 180-day exclusivity when its ANDA is finally approved. It is now also clear that
it is FDAs policy that if the patent expires after the first generic applicant has final
approval of its ANDA but before the 180-day exclusivity period has ended, the appli-
cant is no longer entitled to exclusivity as of the date of the patent's expiration.
a. Patent expiry before final approval.
Andrx was the first to file a paragraph IV certification with respect to 10 of the
11 patents listed by AstraZeneca in relation to the 40 mg version of its product
Prilosec (omeprazole). Dr. Reddy's was the first to file a paragraph IV certification
for the 40 mg version on the other patent. (Andrx had filed a paragraph III.) The
patent expired after both ANDAs were tentatively approved, but before either was
finally approved. FDA concluded that Dr. Reddy's lost its eligibility for exclusiv-
ity when the patent expired, on the theory that the company was required at that
time to amend its ANDA to convert the paragraph IV certification to a paragraph
II certification.1 4' Dr. Reddy's brought suit against FDA, arguing that the agency
may not require a generic applicant to amend its certification prior to final ANDA
approval, and that an ANDA is eligible for exclusivity if it contains the appropriate
paragraph IV certification at the time of filing. The district court found the statute
ambiguous on both points, however, and upheld the agency's decision. 142 Thus Dr.
Reddy's was not entitled to share Andrx's 180-day exclusivity.
b. Patent-expiry before conclusion of 180-day exclusivity.
Mylan submitted the first ANDA to market generic versions of 2.5 mg, 5 mg,
and 10 mg Norvasc (amlodipine besylate) tablets on May 22, 2002. The ANDA
contained paragraph IV certifications for the two patents Pfizer had listed for the
drug. The later of these two patents, and the one at issue, was due to expire on
March 25, 2007. The other patent was due to expire on July 31, 2006. Pfizer sued
Mylan for patent infringement, but it did not file its lawsuit within 45 days of
receiving notice of Mylan's paragraph IV certification. As a result, no 30-month
stay of approval applied. On October 3, 2005, FDA approved Mylan's ANDA. In
140 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Pravastatin ANDA Ap-
plicant 15 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/announce/Pravastatin-18ODay-amend.pdf.
14, See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C).
142 Dr. Reddy's Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 302 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D.N.J. (2003)). The court also noted
that the agency had set forth its interpretation of the statute at least twice prior to its decision on Dr. Reddy's
application. Id. at 351, citing 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,348 (Oct. 3, 1994) ("a patent is deemed to be relevant
until the end of the term of the patent or applicable 180-day period, whichever occurs first") and FDA,
Response to APP and Pharmachemie Citizen Petitions, Docket No. 1999P-1271 (Aug. 2, 1999). The court
characterized the latter as stating that "because exclusivity cannot extend beyond the expiration of a patent,
an ANDA applicant who is first to file a paragraph IV certification on a patent loses its eligibility based upon
that patent when the patent expires before either of the triggering events occurs."
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February 2007, a district court in Pennsylvania held that Mylan infringed Pfizer's
remaining unexpired patent (the one due to expire in 2007).1 On March 16, 2007,
the district court enjoined Mylan from marketing its generic product and ordered
that the effective date of any approval of Mylan's ANDA be no earlier than pat-
ent expiry.'4
Mylan appealed and sought a stay of the district court's order.'45 The Federal Cir-
cuit granted the stay on March 23, 2007, and Mylan launched its generic amlodipine
product that same day. 46 On March 25, 2007, the patent expired. The following day,
Mylan submitted a Petition for Stay of Action to FDA requesting that the agency
not issue final approval to any ANDAs for generic amlodipine tablets until Mylan's
180-day exclusivity expired on September 23, 2007.141 Mylan also sued FDA claiming
it was entitled to 180-day exclusivity and requesting that the court enjoin FDA from
approving other ANDAs for amlodipine until the merits of its claim could be heard.
FDA proposed to seek comments from interested parties before it responded. The
district court ordered FDA to provide a decision by April 11, 2007, and to take no
action on pending ANDAs for amlodipine until April 13, 2007.141
The agency opened a docket and solicited comments on, among others, the ques-
tion whether "180-day exclusivity triggered before a patent expires continue[s] to
bar approvals of other ANDAs after the patent expires, even if other ANDA ap-
plicants change their certifications to paragraph II or withdraw their certifications
altogether?"149 While many of those submitting comments to FDA argued that the
agency had a longstanding position that 180-day exclusivity does not extend beyond
patent expiration, Mylan asserted that once the period of 180-day exclusivity is
triggered, the first applicant's right to exclusivity is vested and consequently cannot
be forfeited. The agency concluded, however, that Mylan's exclusivity terminated
when the patent expired on March 25, 2007. It noted that both the statute and its
own regulations require ANDA applicants to change their paragraph IV certifi-
cations to paragraph II certifications when a patent expires. 150 Applications with
paragraph II certifications are eligible for immediate approval upon patent expiry. 5
Therefore, because paragraph IV certifications cease to be accurate upon patent
expiry, once a patent expires, neither the patent nor the 180-day exclusivity based
"I Pfizer, Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 02-cv-1628, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14417 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27,
2007).
'" Pfizer, Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 02-cv-1628, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18699 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16,
2007), rev 'd, 236 Fed. Appx. 608 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
145 In the meantime, in a case involving another ANDA applicant, the Federal Circuit held invalid three
claims in the patent. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. (2007)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
110 (2007).
46 Because the Federal Circuit stayed the district court order, FDA determined that it had "no basis
to convert the approval status of Mylan's ANDA from approved to tentatively approved." Letter from Gary
J. Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to ANDA Applicant/Holder for Amlodipine Besylate
Tablets 5 n.4 (Apr. 18, 2007).
147 Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. 2007P-0 116 (Mar. 26, 2007).
'4 Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 07-cv-579 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2007) (order). These deadlines were
extended to April 18 and April 20, respectively. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 07-cv-579 (D.D.C. Apr.
10, 2007) (order).
"I FDA, Request for Comments: Amlodipine ANDA Approvals, Docket No. 2007N-0123 (Mar. 28,
2007).
1So See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IH); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C) ("[A]n applicant shall
amend a submitted certification if, at any time before the effective date of the approval of the application,
the applicant learns that the submitted certification is no longer accurate").
... See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(i) (stating that when an applicant files a paragraph II certification,
approval of the applicant's ANDA "may be made effective immediately"); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii).
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on a paragraph IV certification to that patent presents a barrier to the approval of
subsequent ANDAs. The court found FDA's decision "reasonable."'
15 2
It would be consistent for FDA to reach the same conclusion with respect to
new ANDAs, although of course exclusivity is earned on a product-by-product
basis, rather than a patent-by-patent basis. Applied to new ANDAs, this conclusion
suggests that if all of the patents as to which the first applicant filed a paragraph
IV certification qualifying it for exclusivity expire before the first generic appli-
cant has final approval of its ANDA, the applicant must amend its certifications
from paragraph IV to paragraph II and will no longer be entitled to 180 days of
exclusivity when its ANDA is finally approved. Moreover, if all of these patents
expire after the first generic applicant has final approval of its ANDA but before
the 180-day exclusivity period has ended, presumably the applicant is no longer
entitled to exclusivity. Indeed, the 2003 legislation states clearly that the first ap-
plicant forfeits exclusivity if all of the patents as to which it filed a paragraph IV
certification qualifying it for exclusivity have expired.'53 It does not differentiate
between expiry before final approval and expiry after final approval.
3. What is the effect of delisting a patent once a paragraph IV
certification has been submitted?
a. Old ANDAs.
As noted in the authors' 2007 article, with respect to old ANDAs, generally
speaking, if a patent is removed from the Orange Book, FDA requires ANDA
applicants to delete their paragraph IV certifications. FDAs policy creating an
exception if a first ANDA applicant was sued by the patent owner was found to be
inconsistent with the statute. The case in question, involving generic simvastatin and
usually referred to as the Ranbaxy case, was discussed in the authors' last article.
It is discussed again below, because it continues to be relevant. There has been one
case since the last article. This case, involving generic risperidone, confirms that
if a patent is removed from the electronic Orange Book prior to submission of the
ANDA in question, a paragraph IV certification is inappropriate even if the paper
Orange Book has not been revised.
i. The Ranbaxy case.
IVAX sought approval of 5 mg, 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40 mg generic versions of
Merck's Zocor (simvastatin). IVAX was the first generic applicant to challenge
two patents claiming approved methods of use. The patents in question appar-
ently claimed compounds related to simvastatin, rather than simvastatin itself. '
4
Following submission of the IVAX ANDA, FDA amended its regulations to state
that listed drug substance patents must claim the active ingredient of an approved
drug product, rather than a metabolite or an intermediate. 5 At Merck's request,
152 Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d 109, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2007). The appeal was later
dismissed as moot. Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 07-5156, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24964 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
23, 2007).
153 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).
114 The FTC characterized the substance as "related to" simvastatin. FTC, Response to Citizen Petition
by IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket No. 2005P-0008 (Apr. 5, 2005), at 4. Ranbaxy characterized the
compounds as "related compounds of simvastatin" that it believed to be "present in Zocor" and that were "a
byproduct of Merck's manufacture of simvastatin." Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Citizen Petition, Docket
No. 2005P-0046 (Feb. 1, 2005), at 2.
115 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003).
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and following several additional letters to the Agency (from private law firms,
presumably representing generic company interests) stating that the patents should
not be listed, the agency removed the patents from the Orange Book. This had the
effect of permitting subsequent ANDA applicants to omit certifications relating
to the patents. IVAX petitioned the agency to relist the patents and not approve
subsequent ANDAs until its exclusivity had concluded. 56 Ranbaxy filed a citizen
petition with respect to 80 mg simvastatin and raised the same issue with respect to
the same two delisted patents.57 Teva opposed the petitions, arguing that "incor-
rectly listed patents cannot support exclusivity."'' 18
FDA denied both petitions, stating that it does "not interpret the statute to require
that an ANDA applicant who has submitted the first paragraph IV certification
to a patent always remain eligible for 180-day exclusivity as to that patent even if
the NDA holder has asked that the patent be delisted."' 59 Instead, FDA noted, it
is "consistent with the language and purposes of the statute generally to delist a
patent when the NDA holder requests that we do so" and to therefore "remove
the basis for exclusivity as to that patent." There is "one limited exception" in the
regulations, pursuant to which FDA maintains the listing of a patent where the
paragraph IV challenge of the first ANDA applicant has resulted in litigation.
This ensures that victory in the patent litigation, which would result in delisting
of the patent, will not also result in loss of exclusivity. Merck had not sued either
IVAX or Ranbaxy, however, so this limited exception did not apply. The patents
were delisted, and FDA concluded that neither generic manufacturer was entitled
to exclusivity with respect to the patents.
In litigation that followed, however, both the district court and the D.C. Circuit
found that FDA should not have delisted the patents. The district court noted that
section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) is "clear and unambiguous" in providing that the first ge-
neric applicant may qualify for exclusivity "in one of two ways"-a court decision
or commercial marketing. Further, "[o]f the two methods Congress has provided
by which the first ANDA applicant's 180-day period of exclusivity is triggered,
one requires litigation and one does not." The issue, according to the court, was
whether FDA could "effectively restrict the reward to only a sued ANDA holder,
by delisting a patent after the ANDA holder successfully avoided suit." It noted
that the "delisting practice as applied here effectively eliminated Congress's 'first
commercial marketing' trigger, in violation of the clear command of Congress."
Although FDA may adopt a delisting practice, it cannot favor "one of two equal
statutory provisions over the other." 60The agency relisted the patents in June 2006,
and in November the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.'16
ii. The risperidone case.
On August 3, 2007, Teva submitted a citizen petition to FDA stating that it was
the first ANDA applicant to submit a paragraph IV certification for one of two
patents listed for 0.25 mg, 0.5 mg, 1 mg, 2 mg, 3 mg, and 4 mg Risperdal (risperidone)
tablets and thus should be eligible for exclusivity.'62 The patent referenced in Teva's
156 IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2005P-0008 (Jan. 5, 2005).
... Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2005P-0046 (Feb. 1, 2005).
"I Teva, Response, Docket No. 2005P-0046 (June 8, 2005), at 2.
15' FDA, Response, Docket Nos. 2005P-0008 and 2005P-0046 (Oct. 24, 2005).
'6 Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 459 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2006).
61 Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
'62 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2007P-0316 (Docket No. FDA-2007-
P-0 170) (Aug. 3, 2007).
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paragraph IV certification, the '952 patent, was listed as expiring on October 27,
2009. Teva submitted a paragraph III certification with respect to the other patent,
which had a period of pediatric exclusivity scheduled to end on June 29, 2008.
Teva contended that the '952 patent appeared in the "official" or printed edition of
the Orange Book on August 28, 2001, the date on which Teva submitted its ANDA
and paragraph IV certification. According to Teva, FDA notified the company on
October 12, 2001, that the agency had delisted the patent from the Orange Book at
the request of Johnson & Johnson (J&J) (Janssen, the manufacturer of Risperdal,
is part of the J&J family of companies) and refused to file its ANDA unless Teva
modified its patent certification to reflect that the patent was no longer listed. Teva
argued that the "official" delisting of the patent did not occur until January 2002
when FDA issued a revised printed edition of the Orange Book and that the agency
should relist the patent and confirm Teva's right to 180-day exclusivity. Teva cited
Ranbaxy, arguing that FDA may not delist a patent after a company submits an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to that patent.
FDA denied Teva's request to relist the patent.'63 The agency had modified its
patent listing database on June 11, 2001, prior to submission of Teva's ANDA, to
remove the patent in question from the entries for Risperdal tablets. Moreover, when
Teva submitted its ANDA, the electronic Orange Book contained the most current
information regarding patents listed for Risperdal tablets and, in particular, did not
include the patent in question. According to FDA, Teva's "assertion that the delisting
of the '952 patent did not become effective until publication of the 2002 annual edition
of the Orange Book" was "without merit." Accordingly, FDA ruled that because the
delisting was proper, Teva was not eligible for 180-day exclusivity.
In litigation that followed, the district court granted summary judgment to Teva
and required FDA to relist the patent in the Orange Book and restore Teva's para-
graph IV certification and 180-day exclusivity.16 The court of appeals reversed,
165
explaining that the FDCA provides that a "successful paragraph IV certification
must identify a patent that 'claims the listed drug' or that 'claims a use for such listed
drug for which the applicant is seeking approval."' If there is no patent that claims
the listed drug, "there can be no valid certification" and thus no 180-day exclusivity
Moreover, "[a]ll patent claim information is provided by the NDA holder." Thus,
"as a practical matter, a patent claims a drug when the NDA holder says it does." In
this case, when Teva submitted its ANDA for generic Risperdal, Janssen had already
notified FDA that it had withdrawn the patent. In addition, FDA had removed the
listing from the electronic version of the Orange Book and thus informed Teva of
its action. The D.C. Circuit found that although the printed version of the Orange
Book still listed the patent, "[i]nadvertent failure by the agency to meet its separate
publication requirement cannot defeat facts."
b. New ANDAs.
For new ANDAs, the MMA contains a forfeiture provision based on withdrawal
of patent listings. Specifically, if 75 days have elapsed since approval of the first
applicant's ANDA was made effective (or 30 months have elapsed since the first
applicant's ANDA was submitted), then if the last of the patents qualifying it for
exclusivity is delisted, the first applicant will forfeit exclusivity if it fails to market
163 FDA, Response, Docket No. 2007P-0316 (Docket No. FDA-2007-P-0 170) (Feb. 26, 2008).
164 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 08-cv-00395 (D.D.C. April 11, 2008) (order).
165 Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 08-5141, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23638 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
12, 2008),judgment entered by, 548 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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within 75 days.166 The agency has now twice invoked the withdrawal of patent list-
ings to find forfeiture.
i. Generic acarbose.
On March 22, 2005, Cobalt became the first applicant to submit an ANDA for
a generic version of Precose (acarbose) tablets. The ANDA contained a paragraph
IV certification for the one patent listed for Precose tablets. Bayer, the NDA holder,
did not file a patent infringement action against Cobalt. In a letter dated September
26, 2007, to applicants with pending ANDAs for generic acarbose tablets, FDA
stated that more than 30 months had passed since it had received the first applicant's
ANDA. It also noted that Bayer had requested that the agency delist the patent in
question.'67 The agency asked for comments regarding the applicability of several
forfeiture provisions to the first applicant's eligibility for 180-day exclusivity, includ-
ing the delisting forfeiture event under the failure to market provision.1 61
In a letter dated May 7, 2008, FDA approved Cobalt's ANDA but concluded that
the company had forfeited its 180-day exclusivity because it did not begin to market
its product by September 22, 2007. For purposes of the first prong of the failure to
market provision, FDA concluded that September 22, 2007, was the "earlier of"- 1)
the date that was 30 months from the date on which Cobalt submitted a substantially
complete ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to the patent 69 and 2) the
date that was 75 days after FDA approved Cobalt's ANDA. 170 FDA also concluded
that the triggering event for the second prong of the failure to market provision was
Bayer's request to delist the Precose patent on April 16, 2007.'71 Based on this finding, 72
166 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC).
167 The agency has adopted a new policy of not delisting patents from the Orange Book upon request by
the innovator. Instead it waits until 75 days have passed and a forfeiture decision is required. As explained by
the agency, "[biecause immediate removal of patent information from the Orange Book upon withdrawal of
the patent information by the NDA holder could result in ANDA applicants withdrawing corresponding patent
certifications prematurely and thus undermining a first applicant's exclusivity, FDA will leave information
related to withdrawn patents in the Orange Book until it has determined that any related 180-day exclusivity
has expired." FDA, Decision Letter, Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417
(Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 7,2008), at 7 n.13.
6I FDA, Request for Comments: Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417
(Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (Sept. 26, 2007).
161 In response to Cobalt's argument that the 30-month periods referenced in the failure to market and
failure to obtain tentative approval forfeiture provisions do not begin to run until receipt of the first applicant's
notice letter, FDA noted that while the start date for calculating the 30-month period under the tentative approval
forfeiture provision is the date on which an ANDA application is "filed," the start date for calculating the 30-month
period under the failure to market provision is the date of "submission" of the ANDA. The agency reasoned that
because there is no evidence that Congress intended a difference between the two terms and because both terms
are used in the context of "first applicant" status, it will interpret the terms "filed" and "submission" to refer to
the date on which the agency determines an ANDA to be sufficiently complete to permit substantive review.
FDA, Decision Letter, Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417 (Docket No. FDA-
2007-N-0445) (May 7, 2008), at 9 n.15. FDA further noted that when an ANDA is "determined, upon review, to
have been substantially complete as of the day it was submitted to FDA, it will be deemed to have been received
as of the date it was submitted (i.e., date-stamped by the appropriate FDA mail-room)." Id. at 6 n.10.
170 Cobalt's ANDA was deemed substantially complete on March 22, 2005; 30 months from that date
was September 22, 2007. Cobalt's ANDA was approved on May 7, 2008; the 75-day period would expire
on July 21, 2008. Therefore, September 22, 2007, was the relevant date for the first prong of the failure to
market analysis.
'71 Neither of the other possible triggering events (a final decision that the patent is invalid or not
infringed, or a settlement order or consent decree entering final judgment that includes a finding that the
patent was invalid or not infringed) had occurred.
172 FDA noted that the D.C. Circuit stated in Ranbaxy that the "decisions rendered by FDA and the
district court had been made pursuant to the Act 'as it stood before the MMA and, because the MMA was
not made retroactive ... this decision is also geared to the Act pre-MMA)."' FDA, Decision Letter, Acarbose
Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 7, 2008)
(citing Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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the agency concluded that between September 22, 2007, and June 30, 2007 (75 days
after Bayer withdrew its patent on April 16, 2007), September 22, 2007, was also the
"later of" date and thus was the controlling date. Because Cobalt failed to market its
generic acarbose tablets by September 22, 2007, it forfeited its 180-day exclusivity. As
a result, FDA also approved the ANDA submitted by a subsequent applicant, Roxane
Laboratories.
FDA noted that it had "considered and rejected" comments by Cobalt that
eligibility for 180-day exclusivity following the pioneer's voluntary withdrawal of
its patent should be governed by Ranbaxy. In Ranbaxy, the D.C. Circuit held that
"FDA may not condition the delisting of a patent on the existence of patent litiga-
tion, and thus deprive an ANDA applicant ... of a period of marketing exclusivity
for which it would otherwise be eligible." According to FDA, the court in Ranbaxy
"did not purport to render a decision on patent delisting and exclusivity under the
MMA." And the new failure to market forfeiture provision specifically addresses the
effect of patent delisting on eligibility for 180-day exclusivity for new ANDAs.173
ii. Generic dorzolamide hydrochloride/timolol
maleate.
On October 11, 2005, Hi-Tech became the first applicant to submit a substan-
tially complete ANDA for a generic version of Cosopt (dorzolamide hydrochlo-
ride/timolol maleate), an ophthalmic drug indicated for the treatment of ocular
hypertension and open-angle glaucoma. Merck, the manufacturer of Cosopt, had
listed three patents in the Orange Book for Cosopt. One of these patents was the
'413 patent, which expired on April 28, 2008. Merck had obtained a period of
pediatric exclusivity, which applied to the patent until October 28, 2008. The other
two patents, the '735 patent and the '443 patent, expire on April 17, 2011. Hi-Tech
submitted paragraph IV certifications for all three patents. Merck sued Hi-Tech
only for infringement of the '413 patent. It also filed a statutory disclaimer of the
'735 and '443 patents with the PTO, and it requested that FDA delist the patents
from the Orange Book.
On the day before Merck made its delisting request, the district court entered
final judgment on the pleadings in Merck's favor and ordered that the effective
date of approval of Hi-Tech's ANDA could not occur prior to October 28, 2008,
the expiration of the pediatric exclusivity period attached to the '413 patent. 17 4 The
Federal Circuit affirmed.'75 Hi-Tech brought suit against FDA, seeking a declara-
tory judgment that its ANDA was entitled to 180-day exclusivity and seeking to
enjoin FDA from granting final approval to any other ANDA for 180 days after
Hi-Tech commenced marketing of its product, which it expected to do on October
28, 2008.176
According to Hi-Tech's brief, FDA had stated that it would not rule on Hi-Tech's
exclusivity "until no earlier than October 28, 2008." Hi-Tech argued that because it
was "simply not possible" for the company to wait until that date to file a lawsuit
'13 Cobalt brought suit against the agency but voluntarily dismissed its suit following denial of a TRO.
Cobalt Labs. Inc. v. FDA, No. 08-cv-00798 (D.D.C. May 16, 2008) (notice of voluntary dismissal without
prejudice).
174 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc., Nos. 06-266 and 06-268, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95820 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2006).
'75 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc., 482 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
176 Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FDA, No. 08-cv-01495 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008) (complaint). A mo-
tion to intervene as a defendant filed by Apotex, a subsequent ANDA filer, was granted by the district court
on September 5, 2008.
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and seek and obtain relief from the court if the agency "incorrectly decide[d]" that
Hi-Tech was not entitled to 180-day exclusivity, it was entitled to relief "well before"
October 28. Hi-Tech further argued that because there was no legal right to market
prior to October 28 (the expiration of pediatric exclusivity relating to the '413 pat-
ent), there could be no finding of forfeiture based on failure to market. In addition,
it asserted that the '735 and '443 patents had not and could not be withdrawn from
the Orange Book in light of Ranbaxy. Therefore, according to Hi-Tech, the second
prong of the failure to market provision could not have been satisfied. In response,
FDA opened a docket and began collecting comment on the issue.'77
Prior to the issuance of FDA's determination regarding forfeiture, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia denied Hi-Tech's request for a preliminary
injunction because there had been no final agency action.' In an opinion filed
October 10, 2008, the district court stated that "Hi-Tech is not entitled to judicial
review of the interpretation and application of the exclusivity forfeiture provisions
of the [MMA] until the FDA itself first interprets and applies those provisions with
respect to Hi-Tech's ANDA." The court, however, requested that FDA "attempt
to make a determination with respect to Hi-Tech's entitlement to exclusivity in
advance of October 28, 2008."
On October 28, FDA announced that Hi-Tech had forfeited its eligibility for 180-
day exclusivity on April 11, 2008.179 As to each patent for which Hi-Tech submitted
a paragraph IV certification initially qualifying it as a first applicant (the '413, '735,
and '443 patents), the generic manufacturer either failed to lawfully maintain its
paragraph IV certification or forfeited its exclusivity under the failure to market
provision. First, FDA noted, Hi-Tech failed to lawfully maintain a paragraph IV
certification with respect to the '413 patent because it lost its patent litigation as
to that patent. Hi-Tech was required to change its paragraph IV certification to
a paragraph III certification.' Second, Hi-Tech had forfeited its eligibility for
exclusivity with respect to the '735 and '443 patents. For purposes of the first
prong of the failure to market provision, April 11, 2008, was the "earlier of" date
between the date that was 30 months from the date on which Hi-Tech submitted a
substantially complete ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to the pat-
ents and the date that was 75 days after FDA approved Hi-Tech's ANDA.' t ' The
triggering event under the second prong was Merck's request to delist the '735 and
'443 patents on April 26, 2006. Based on this finding, FDA concluded that between
April 11, 2008, and July 10, 2006 (75 days after Merck withdrew its patents), April
11, 2008, was the "later of" and thus the controlling date. Because Hi-Tech failed
to market its generic version of Cosopt by April 11, 2008, it forfeited its eligibility
for 180-day exclusivity.
FDA rejected Hi-Tech's argument that the agency "mishandled" Merck's request
that the '735 and '443 patents be delisted. The agency explained that it has "imple-
177 FDA, Request for Comments: Dorzolamide Hydrochloride/Timolol Maleate Tablets and 180-Day
Exclusivity, Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0483 (Sept. 4, 2008).
I Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FDA, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
179 FDA, Decision Letter, Dorzolamide Hydrochloride/Timolol Maleate Tablets and 180-Day Exclusiv-
ity, Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0483 (Oct. 28, 2008).
SO Although Hi-Tech did not submit its paragraph I11 certification to the '413 patent until April 10, 2008,
as of June 11, 2007, when the Federal Circuit entered the mandate in the litigation involving the '413 patent,
FDA stated that "Hi-Tech could no longer lawfully maintain its paragraph V certification." Id at 6.
I Hi-Tech's ANDA was deemed substantially complete on October 11, 2005; 30 months from that
date was April 11, 2008. Hi-Tech's ANDA was approved on October 28, 2008; the 75-day period expired on
January 11, 2009. Therefore April 11, 2008, was the relevant date for the first prong of the failure to market
analysis.
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mented the patent withdrawal provision [of the failure to market provision] so as to
preserve 180-day exclusivity for first applicants by retaining that patent information
in the Orange Book until the agency has determined that the first applicants with
certifications to those patents have either used or forfeited the exclusivity period."
According to the agency, if it were to immediately delist the patent upon a request
by the NDA holder that the patent be withdrawn, this would result in an "immedi-
ate loss" of eligibility for 180-day exclusivity and would be "inconsistent" with the
failure to market provision, which contemplates that, for at least 75 days after the
patent is withdrawn, a first applicant will maintain its eligibility to begin its 180-day
period of exclusivity. The agency again rejected the argument that eligibility for
180-day exclusivity following an NDA holder's voluntary withdrawal of its patent
should be governed by "the rule established in Ranbaxy." According to FDA, the
court in that case "did not purport to render a decision on patent delisting and
exclusivity under the MMA." Although Hi-Tech brought suit, the court decided
the case on the pediatric exclusivity issue, finding that the forfeiture clock had not
been tolled during the pediatric exclusivity term as discussed above in section II.
C. 3., ' and it never reached the delisting question.
4. What is the effect of afirst applicant's failure to market its
generic product within 30 months of submitting its ANDA?
With respect to old ANDAs, generally speaking there is no effect if the first
applicant fails to market its generic product within 30 months of submitting its
ANDA. This is one reason subsequent applicants have filed declaratory judgment
actions, seeking to trigger the running of the 180 days.'83 For new ANDAs, how-
ever, the MMA contains a forfeiture provision based on an applicant's failure to
market within 30 months of submitting its application. 14 FDA has interpreted this
provision three times, confirming that two events must occur for forfeiture to hap-
pen: 1) 75 days must pass following an appellate court decision, settlement order,
consent decree, or patent delisting, and 2) 30 months must pass following ANDA
submission or 75 days must pass following effective ANDA approval.
In a matter involving generic granisetron hydrochloride, the agency declined to
find forfeiture because-despite the applicant's failure to market within the statutory
deadline-there had not yet been a court decision, court order or delisting. Teva was
the first to file an ANDA seeking approval to market a generic version of 1 mg/mL
single dose vials of Kytril (granisetron hydrochloride), an antinauseant and antiemetic
drug. The ANDA, received for filing on June 1, 2004, contained a paragraph III
certification for one patent that expired on December 29, 2007; a section viii state-
ment as to a patent that expires on September 14, 2016; and the first paragraph IV
certification for a patent that expires in 2019. Roche, the innovator, did not sue Teva
for patent infringement, and FDA tentatively approved Teva's application on August
16, 2005. In a letter dated September 28, 2007, Teva requested that FDA confirm
that it was entitled to 180-day exclusivity for its generic granisetron hydrochloride
product.'85 It argued that even though more than 30 months had elapsed since it had
submitted its ANDA, it had not forfeited its exclusivity because the possibility of a
"later" forfeiture event under the failure to market provision-a court decision, court
112 Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FDA, 587 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2008).
8 See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 04-cv-02922 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2004)
(complaint).
'u 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
'5 Letter from Marc A. Goshko, Executive Director, Teva North America, to Gary Buehler, Director, FDA
Office of Generic Drugs, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Sept. 28, 2007).
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order, or delisting-still remained. After opening a docket to solicit comments, 8 6
FDA agreed, approved the ANDA, and granted 180-day exclusivity.'87 No claim of
infringement on the patent at issue had been brought against Teva or any subsequent
applicant, nor had any ANDA applicant brought a declaratory judgment action
regarding the patent. Consequently, no court had entered a final judgment of inva-
lidity or non-infringement, and no court had signed a settlement order or consent
decree entering final judgment of invalidity or non-infringement. In addition, Roche,
the holder of the NDA for Kytril, had not requested that the patent be withdrawn
from the Orange Book. None of these three possible events had occurred, the agency
reasoned, so there was no forfeiture.
In a matter involving generic acarbose, the agency did find forfeiture for fail-
ure to market. As discussed above in section III. A. 3. b. i., Cobalt submitted an
ANDA for a generic version of Precose (acarbose) tablets, along with a paragraph
IV certification, on March 22, 2005. As the first filer, it was eligible for 180-day
exclusivity In a September 26, 2007 letter to applicants with pending ANDAs for
generic acarbose tablets, FDA solicited comments regarding the applicability of
the forfeiture provisions to Cobalt's eligibility for 180-day exclusivity. In May 2000,
FDA approved Cobalt's ANDA but concluded that the manufacturer had forfeited
its exclusivity on September 22, 2007, because the company did not begin to market
its product by that date. The triggering event under the second prong of this forfei-
ture provision was Bayer's request to delist the Precose patent on April 16, 2007,
and the matter is discussed in section 1II. A. 3. b. i. The agency similarly relied on
delisting when it found forfeiture for failure to market in the generic dorzolamide
hydrochloride/timolol maleate matter, discussed in section III. A. 3. b. ii. In this
matter, FDA found that Hi-Tech forfeited exclusivity because more than 30 months
had passed since the submission of its ANDA and because more than 75 days had
passed since Merck requested the delisting of the relevant patents.
5. What is the effect of failing to obtain tentative approval within
30 months after filing an ANDA?
With respect to old ANDAs, generally speaking there is no effect if the first ap-
plicant fails to market its product within 30 months of submitting its ANDA. For
new ANDAs, however, if an applicant fails to obtain tentative approval within 30
months after filing its ANDA (and the failure is not caused by a post-filing change
in or a review of the ANDA approval requirements), the first applicant will forfeit
exclusivity.' 8 Even if a first applicant fails to obtain tentative approval within 30
months after filing its ANDA, however, FDA will not make a formal determination
of forfeiture unless a subsequent applicant becomes eligible for approval within 180
days after the first applicant begins commercial marketing." 9
186 FDA, Request for Comments: Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug
Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Oct. 11, 2007).
187 FDA, Decision Letter, Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity,
Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Jan. 17, 2008).
188 21 U.S.C. § 355j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).
189 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Sandoz Inc. 3 (July 31, 2006)
(noting in approval letter for Sandoz's ANDA that the agency "is not making a formal determination at this
time of Sandoz's eligibility for 180-day generic drug exclusivity" and "will do so only if another applicant
becomes eligible for approval within 180 days after Sandoz begins commercial marketing of [its generic
product]"); Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Perrigo R&D Co. 3 (Feb.
6, 2008) (noting in approval letter for Perrigo's ANDA that the agency "is not making a formal determina-
tion at this time of Perrigo's eligibility for 180-day generic drug exclusivity" and "will do so only if another
applicant becomes eligible for approval within 180 days after Perrigo begins commercial marketing of [its
generic product]").
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As discussed above in sections III. A. 3. b. i., and III. A. 4., Cobalt forfeited its
180-day exclusivity for its generic acarbose tablets because 30 months had passed
after the ANDA was deemed substantially complete and because 75 days had passed
since Bayer delisted the patent. In the nonrulemaking docket that FDA opened for
this matter, the agency also asked for comment on the effect of Cobalt's failure to
obtain tentative approval within 30 months of filing its ANDA on its exclusivity.
Ultimately, FDA determined that although Cobalt had forfeited its exclusivity
under the failure to market provision, it had not forfeited its exclusivity because of
its failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months after filing its ANDA.'90
This forfeiture provision contains an exception if failure to obtain tentative ap-
proval is caused by a change in, or review of, the requirements for approval of the
application imposed after the application was filed. Moreover, under amendments
to the FDCA included in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
(FDAAA), Congress clarified that if approval of a first applicant's ANDA is delayed
because of a petition, the 30-month period is extended by a period of time equal
to the period beginning on the date on which the petition is received and ending
on the date of final agency action on the petition. 1 Thus, the agency reasoned,
because Cobalt had submitted petitions regarding the appropriate methodology
for establishing bioequivalence for acarbose products'92 and because FDA changed
its bioequivalence requirements with respect Cobalt's ANDA in August 2006,193
Cobalt was subject to the exception. Therefore it did not forfeit exclusivity due to
its failure to obtain tentative approval by September 22, 2007.
6. What is the effect of a settlement agreement, terminating pat-
ent litigation, on the first applicant's eligibility for exclusivity?
A settlement agreement terminating patent litigation has no effect on the ANDA
applicant's 180-day exclusivity, unless a court signs a settlement order or consent
decree finding a patent invalid or not infringed, or there is a final, unappealable
order finding that the settlement agreement violates antitrust laws. Prior to the
passage of the MMA in 2003, FDA concluded that a settlement agreement, which
ended patent infringement litigation, effectively turned a paragraph IV certifica-
tion into a paragraph III certification. A federal court in West Virginia held that
"I As noted above, Cobalt's ANDA was sufficiently complete for review on March 22, 2005. The 30-
month period for purposes of the failure to obtain tentative approval forfeiture provision therefore began on
that date. It ended on September 22, 2007. Cobalt did not obtain tentative approval by that date.
191 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(G). According to FDA, the FDAAA makes clear that the failure to obtain
tentative approval provision "gives a first applicant 30 months in which to obtain either tentative approval
or approval." FDA, Decision Letter: Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417
(Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 7, 2008), at 10 n. 17.
"I Cobalt Laboratories Inc. and Cobalt Pharmaceuticals Inc., Citizen Petition and Emergency Petition
for Stay of Action, Docket No. 2007P-0448 (FDA-2007-P-0418) (Nov. 9, 2007). In a separate response dated
May 7, 2008, FDA denied Cobalt's request that all ANDA applicants conduct in vivo bioequivalence test-
ing. It further denied Cobalt's request not to grant bioequivalence waivers to ANDA applicants. The agency,
however, granted in part Cobalt's request that ANDA applicants conduct in vivo bioequivalence testing based
on its determination that such testing is required if the test product is not qualitatively and quantitatively the
same as the reference listed drug with respect to inactive ingredients. FDA, Response, Docket No. 2007P-
0448 (FDA-2007-P-0418) (May 7, 2008), at 10-11.
193 Cobalt originally conducted its bioequivalence study using the 100 mg strength tablets. It was
advised by the agency on August 8, 2006, that its in vivo bioequivalence study using that strength was not
acceptable. As a result, Cobalt relied on a different strength of acarbose tablets for its in vivo bioequivalence
study. FDA, Decision Letter: Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417 (Docket
No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 7, 2008), at 11.
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the agency's decision on this issue was unreasonable. Congress addressed this issue
in the 2003 legislation by adding two forfeiture provisions related to settlements.
Under the failure to market provision, if 75 days have passed since approval of the
first applicant's ANDA was made effective (or 30 months have elapsed since the
first applicant's ANDA was submitted), then if a court signs a settlement order or
consent decree that enters a final judgment finding the last of the patents qualifying
it for exclusivity invalid or not infringed, the first applicant will forfeit exclusivity
if it fails to market within 75 days. 94 Under a separate forfeiture provision, a first
applicant will also lose its exclusivity if there is an unappealable order finding that
a settlement agreement violates antitrust laws. 95 This second provision was retro-
active, applying to first ANDAs filed before passage of the MMA and pending at
the agency at the time of enactment. 96
Since the authors' last article, FDA declined to find forfeiture in a case involving an
old ANDA where there had not been a final, unappealable order that the agreement
violated antitrust law. In two matters pending at the time this article was written, the
FTC alleges that various settlement agreements violate the antitrust laws. If these are
confirmed by the court, they could result in the first forfeitures under the forfeiture
provision for settlement agreements determined to violate the antitrust laws. There
have been no petitions, or, to the authors' knowledge, court cases involving interpreta-
tion of the failure to market forfeiture provision with respect to settlements.
a. Pre-MMA.
The authors discussed the first settlement case in their prior article (and above
in section II. C. 1.) Mylan was the first ANDA applicant to submit a paragraph
IV certification to the 30 mg dosage of Procardia XL (nifedipine extended release).
Pfizer, the manufacturer of Procardia, sued Mylan for infringement, and the par-
ties settled in February 2000. Although the settlement terms were not disclosed,
Pfizer licensed Mylan to sell a private label version of its own 30 mg, 60 mg, and
90 mg nifedipine extended release products. Pfizer may also have permitted Mylan
to market its own 30 mg product under its own ANDA, but Mylan never did so.
In response to a petition submitted by Teva, a generic manufacturer, asking FDA
to determine if Mylan's ANDA was eligible for exclusivity, 197 FDA concluded that
Mylan was not eligible for exclusivity. 9 ' It reasoned, in part, that the settlement
effectively turned Mylan's paragraph IV certification into a paragraph III certifica-
tion. Mylan brought suit. In the decision that resulted, the district court in West
Virginia, while upholding the case on other grounds discussed above in section II.
C. 1., found this unreasonable. 19  The court was not prepared to allow FDA uni-
laterally to deem the paragraph IV certification to be a paragraph III certification,
simply on account of the settlement.
b. Post-MMA.
In a case involving a settlement agreement relating to generic ramipril, after
opening a docket to consider the forfeiture question, FDA concluded it had no
1- 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(D)(i)(1).
195 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(D)(i)(V).
'96 See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (2003) ("(2) COLLUSIVE AGREE-
MENTS.-If a forfeiture event described in section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) of that Act occurs in the case of an ap-
plicant, the applicant shall forfeit the 180-day period under section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of that Act without regard
to when the first certification under section 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) of that Act for the listed drug was made.")
97 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2000P-1446 (Aug. 9, 2000).
198 FDA, Response, Docket No. 2004P-1446 (Feb. 6, 2001), at 1.
99 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 487 (N.D. W.Va. 2001).
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discretion to find forfeiture absent a final order on the antitrust question. Cobalt
submitted the first ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for generic versions
of 1.25 mg, 2.5 mg, 5 mg, and 10 mg Altace (ramipril) capsules on November 26,
2002. It was, therefore, a first applicant subject to the old ANDA provisions, but-as
noted-the settlement agreement forfeiture provision was retroactive. Aventis and
King Pharmaceuticals, owner of the composition of matter patent and holder of
the NDA for Altace (respectively), sued Cobalt for patent infringement. In March
2004, the three parties signed a stipulation in which Cobalt admitted to infringement
of the patent at issue °.2 Cobalt reserved its invalidity and unenforceability defenses.
In April 2006, a district court in Massachusetts granted a stipulation of dismissal
submitted by Aventis, King Pharmaceuticals, and Cobalt, voluntarily dismissing
the patent litigation without prejudice.2 1' Prior to settlement, the 30-month stay
had expired, and FDA had granted final approval to Cobalt's ANDA, although
Cobalt had not yet begun to market its product. The settlement agreement was
submitted to the FTC.
On March 18,2005, Lupin Pharmaceuticals submitted a subsequent ANDA with
a paragraph IV certification to the same patent. Aventis and King Pharmaceuticals
sued Lupin for patent infringement, and on September 11, 2007, the Federal Circuit
invalidated the patent claims at issue. 202 Before the court issued its mandate, FDA
received a letter from Lupin and a letter from Hyman, Phelps & McNamara on
behalf of an unidentified generic manufacturer challenging Cobalt's eligibility for
180-day exclusivity. Lupin claimed that because of the settlement agreement between
Cobalt, King, and Aventis, Cobalt was no longer entitled to 180-day exclusivity.
According to Lupin, the settlement rendered Cobalt's paragraph IV certification
inaccurate because Cobalt had ceased asserting that the patent in question was
invalid. Lupin further argued that Cobalt was "unwilling to stand behind its initial
opinion" that the patent at issue was invalid and unenforceable, because Cobalt had
not yet marketed its approved generic ramipril product. Lupin cited the nifedipine
matter discussed above, where FDA had found that Mylan had effectively converted
its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III because Mylan had settled the suit
and failed to market nifedipine. 20 3 Hyman Phelps made similar arguments.
After FDA established a docket for comments, 2°4 the Federal Circuit's mandate
issued, and Cobalt began commercial marketing of its ramipril capsules. Shortly
thereafter, FDA informed Lupin that Cobalt was entitled to 180-day exclusivity,
which was triggered with the issuance of the Federal Circuit's mandate. 05 The
agency pointed out that the settlement agreement forfeiture provision was retroac-
tive and therefore applies to old ANDAs, such as Cobalt's ANDA. FDA also noted
that "Congress did not provide for such a forfeiture as the result of any other type
of settlement for ANDAs otherwise governed by" the old provisions. The agency
200 Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Cobalt Pharms., Inc., No. 03-10492 (D. Mass. Mar. 24,
2004) (stipulation).
201 Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Cobalt Pharms., Inc., No. 03-10492 (D. Mass. Apr. 4,2006)
(stipulation of dismissal).
202 Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
203 Lupin stated that FDA did not have the opportunity to appeal the West Virginia district court's conclu-
sion that the agency's determination in the nifedipine case was unreasonable because the agency prevailed
on other grounds.
I FDA, Request for Comments: Ramipril Capsules and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket
No. 2007N-0382 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0035) (Oct. 3, 2007).
205 FDA, Decision Letter, Ramipril Capsules and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket No.
2007N-0382 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0035) (Jan. 29, 2008).
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concluded that because there was no final, unappealable order finding that the
settlement agreement violates antitrust laws, Cobalt did not forfeit its exclusivity
as a result of the settlement agreement." 6
In two cases pending at the time this article was written, the FTC was asserting
that settlement agreements involving generic modafinil and generic testosterone
gel violate the antitrust laws.
On December 24, 2002, Teva, Ranbaxy, Mylan and Barr each filed an ANDA
containing a paragraph IV certification with respect to one of two listed patents
for Provigil (modafinil). 07 This made the four manufacturers eligible for shared
180-day exclusivity, and their ANDAs were governed by the old provisions. The
patent in question expires in October 2014.205 The NDA holder, Cephalon, sued all
four generic manufacturers for patent infringement, and the stay triggered by the
lawsuit expired in June 2006. FDA tentatively approved Barr's ANDA on January
7, 2004, Ranbaxy's ANDA on February 18, 2004, Mylan's ANDA on February
9, 2005, and Teva's ANDA on December 16, 2005. Between December 2005 and
February 2006, Cephalon entered into settlement agreements and signed joint
stipulations dismissing the infringement lawsuit with all four generic manufac-
turers.0 9 According to the FTC, as part of the settlement agreements, Cephalon
"compensated each generic company ... to abandon its patent challenge and agree
to forgo entry until April 2012."'21
On February 13, 2008, the FTC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia seeking a permanent injunction against Cephalon for
"unfair methods of competition" in violation of section 5(a) the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA).21 ' The FTC alleges that Cephalon engaged in anticom-
petitive conduct by inducing the four generic companies to end their patent chal-
lenges and refrain from selling a generic version of Provigil until 2012 in exchange
for payments totaling more than $200 million.2 12 Because Teva, Ranbaxy, Mylan
and Barr share 180-day exclusivity, the FTC further contends that Cephalon, in
making these agreements, has blocked competition by any other generic entrant as
well. Although the FTC did not sue Teva, Ranbaxy, Mylan and Barr, these generic
manufacturers apparently will forfeit 180-day exclusivity if there is a final, unap-
pealable decision of the court that the settlements at issue are unfair methods of
competition and thus violate section 5 of the FTCA.213
The second action brought by the FTC concerns a settlement agreement involving
AndroGel (testosterone gel). On May 13, 2003, Watson became the first applicant
to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to market a generic ver-
sion of Solvay's AndroGel (testosterone gel). 214 Paddock filed a separate ANDA
206 FDA also concluded that Cobalt's paragraph IV certification remained appropriate, because Cobalt
sought and obtained approval to market its ramipril capsule products prior to patent expiry.
207 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244, at 9 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (complaint).
20 Cephalon, the NDA holder, has also received pediatric exclusivity.
209 Cephalon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 03-cv-1394 (D. N.J. Dec. 9, 2005) (joint stipulation for
dismissal with prejudice signed by Cephalon and Teva); Cephalon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 03-cv-1 394
(D. N.J. Dec. 22, 2005) (joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice signed by Cephalon and Ranbaxy);
Cephalon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 03-cv-1394 (D. N.J. Jan. 12, 2006) (joint stipulation for dismissal
with prejudice signed by Cephalon and Mylan); Cephalon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 03-cv- 1394 (D.
N.J. Feb. 2, 2006) (joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice signed by Cephalon and Barr).
2I FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (complaint).
211 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (complaint).
212 Id. at 1-2, 14.
2'13 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
214 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Watson Laboratories, Inc. I
(Jan. 27, 2006).
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later that same month.2"5 Paddock subsequently entered into an agreement with
Par, which provided that Par would share litigation costs with Paddock, market
Paddock's generic testosterone gel, and share in any resulting profits.216 Solvay sued
Watson and Paddock for patent infringement in August 2003, triggering 30-month
stays of approval with respect to both ANDAs. 217 The stays expired in January
2006.218 Shortly thereafter, on January 27, 2006, FDA granted final approval to
Watson's ANDA. 219 On September 13, 2006, Solvay, Watson and Paddock (along
with Par) entered into separate settlements agreements. 220 Under these agreements,
Watson, Paddock and Par agreed to refrain from marketing their generic products
until August 31, 2015, or earlier if another generic company launched a generic
product prior to that date.22' The agreements also included co-promotion deals
and profit sharing. In addition, Solvay and Par agreed to a back-up manufactur-
ing arrangement.2
On January 27, 2009, the FTC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California alleging, in part, that the agreements constitute
"unfair method[s] of competition" in violation of section 5(a) of the FTCA .223 The
FTC contends that Solvay, Watson, Paddock and Par acted unlawfully when "Solvay
paid Watson and Par a share of its AndroGel profits to abandon their patent chal-
lenges and agree to delay generic entry until 2015.224 If there is a final, unappealable
decision of the court that the settlement between Solvay and Watson constitutes an
unfair method of competition and thus violates section 5 of the FTCA, Watson could
forfeit its exclusivity if it has not already launched its generic product.
2 2 1
B. Observations on Forfeiture
1. Impact of the 30-Month Stay on the Failure to Market Provision
One observer has suggested that first applicants subject to the statutorily man-
dated 30-month stay226 will likely be unable to obtain final approval within 30
months of ANDA submission. 27 Because the first prong of the failure to market
215 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 09-cv-00598, at 11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (complaint).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 11-12.
218 Id. at 12.
219 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Watson Laboratories, Inc. I
(Jan. 27, 2006).
21 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 09-cv-00598, at 16, 18 (C. D.Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (complaint).
221 Id.
22 Par also "agreed to transfer $6 million up front to Paddock through a transfer of title of Paddock's
ANDA to Par." Id. at 19.
223 Id. at 27.
224 Press Release, FTC, FTC Sues Drug Companies for Unlawfully Conspiring to Delay the Sale of
Generic AndroGel Until 2015 (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.fitc.gov/opa/2009/02/androgel.shtm.
225 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
226 If the NDA holder or patent owner brings an infringement action within 45 days of receiving notice
of the paragraph IV certification, there will be a 30-month stay of final approval of the application "begin-
ning on the date of the receipt of the notice," unless a final decision is reached earlier in the patent case or
the court hearing the case orders a longer or shorter period. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
222 This observation was made by Robert A. Dormer at a FDLI conference on the Hatch-Waxman
amendments on February 5, 2009. See Robert A. Dormer, 180-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Mechanics, FDA
Decisions, and Recent Court Decisions, Presentation at FDLI's Waxman-Hatch: Back to the Future (Feb.
5, 2009) (stating that "30-month stay of approval under section 505(j)(5)(A)(iii) for paragraph IV litigation
does not begin until approximately 80 days after submission of ANDA, making it unlikely that an applicant
will get approval within 30 months of submission").
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provision is triggered by the earlier of 75 days after the date on which approval
of its application is effective, or 30 months after "the date of submission" of its
application,228 any delay in approval of an ANDA application beyond 30 months
after submission could result in a forfeiture event.
As this observer explained, it is possible that the 30-month stay will not begin
until 80 days after submission of an ANDA. For purposes of interpreting this
provision, FDA considers the date an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certifica-
tion is submitted to be the date the agency "received" the ANDA.229 Under FDA's
regulations, the agency has up to 60 days to determine if it will file, or in other
words accept, an ANDA.2 30 Once it makes this determination, the applicant has
20 days after the date of the postmark on the notice from FDA informing it that
the ANDA has been filed to provide notice of its paragraph IV certification to the
patent owner or NDA holder.2 13 The 30-month stay is counted from the date of
receipt of the notice of the paragraph IV certification. 232 As a result, it is conceiv-
able that the 30-month stay will not begin until 80 days or even slightly longer after
the application has been submitted.
Because FDA may not grant final approval to an ANDA during the 30-month
stay if the patent infringement litigation is ongoing, it is possible that an ANDA
applicant will not obtain final approval until more than 30 months after submission
of its ANDA. If, in the meantime, the second prong of the failure to market provi-
sion has been triggered (for example, if a court in a separate infringement action
involving a subsequent applicant finds the patent at issue invalid or not infringed),
the 30-month lapse since submission will satisfy the first prong-triggering forfeiture
before the ANDA could be approved and the product could ever be marketed.
2. Possibility of "Parking"
When Congress amended the FDCA in 2003 to add provisions for forfeiture
of 180-day exclusivity, one Senator stated that it did so to "ensure that the 180-
day exclusivity period enjoyed by the first generic to challenge a patent cannot be
used as a bottleneck to prevent additional generic competition. ' 233 As some have
noted, FDA's decisions in the granisetron and ramipril matters discussed above in
sections III. A. 4. and III. A. 6. b., respectively, indicate that bottlenecks caused
by a delay in marketing by the first applicant, often referred to as "parking," can
theoretically occur under the new provisions despite the addition of the forfeiture
provisions. 234
The agency acknowledged the possibility of parking in its granisetron decision,
discussed above in section III. A. 4. In that matter, FDA concluded that Teva did
not forfeit its exclusivity because, even though an event under the first prong of
the failure to market provision had occurred, none of the events under the second
228 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa).
229 FDA, Decision Letter, Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity,
Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Jan. 17, 2008), at 4 n.4; FDA, Decision Letter:
Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0417 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May
7, 2008), at 6 n. 10.
230 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(a).
231 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
232 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
233 149 Cong. Rec. 31,200 (2003) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
234 See, e.g., Recent Exclusivity Rulings Favor Generic Filers, GENERIc LtNE, Apr. 2, 2008.
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prong had occurred.2 35 Although FDA indicated that Teva, the first filer, had not
parked its exclusivity, it stated in a footnote that:
[i]nherent in the structure of the "failure to market" forfeiture provisions
is the possibility that a first applicant would be able to enter into a settle-
ment agreement with the NDA holder or patent owner in which a court
does not enter a final judgment of invalidity or non-infringement (i.e.
without a forfeiture event under subpart (bb) occurring), and that subse-
quent applicants would be unable to initiate a forfeiture with a declaratory
judgment action.236
The agency further explained that, under these circumstances, the approval of
an otherwise approvable ANDA, submitted by a subsequent applicant who would
market its generic product if it could obtain approval, could be delayed. 237 As FDA
noted, however, "[t]his potential scenario is not one for which the statute currently
provides a remedy."
238
One of the situations FDA foreshadowed in its granisetron decision as a potential
barrier to triggering forfeiture occurred in the ramipril case. In this matter, as de-
scribed above in section III. A. 6. b., Cobalt submitted the first ANDA with a para-
graph IV certification for different strengths of generic Altace (ramipril) capsules.
Aventis and King Pharmaceuticals sued Cobalt for patent infringement, and the
parties signed a stipulation agreement in which Cobalt admitted its generic ramipril
products would infringe the patent at issue. Cobalt, however, reserved its invalidity
and unenforceability defenses. Lupin, a subsequent ANDA applicant, argued that
the "settlement rendered [Cobalt's] paragraph IV certification inaccurate. 239 FDA
rejected this argument.2 4° As noted, because there was no final, unappealable order
finding that the settlement agreement violates antitrust laws, Cobalt did not forfeit
its exclusivity as a result of the settlement agreement. FDA therefore denied a re-
quest by Lupin, a subsequent applicant, to immediately approve its ANDA. Thus
Cobalt holds the exclusivity, which will not be triggered until commercial marketing
or a final, unappealable court decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed,
and Lupin cannot avail itself of the settlement agreement forfeiture provision in
light of FDA's decision or the failure to market forfeiture provision (because this
provision does not apply to old ANDAs such as Cobalt's).
It is unclear how common the parking scenario will be in the future, however,
in light of other developments in the law, including potentially greater availability
of declaratory judgments in the wake of MedImmune.
3. Timing of Forfeiture Decisions
In two matters, in 2006 and 2008, respectively, it became apparent that FDA
will not make a formal determination of forfeiture unless a subsequent applicant
becomes eligible for approval within 180 days after the first applicant begins com-
235 FDA Decision Letter: Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity,
Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Jan. 17, 2008), at 5.
236 Id. at 5 n.6.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 FDA, Decision Letter: Ramipril Capsules and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket No.
2007N-0382 (FDA-2007-N-0035) (Jan. 29, 2008), at 5.
240 Id.
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mercial marketing. The first involved generic extended release metoprolol succinate,
and the second involved generic famotidine.
Sandoz was the first applicant to submit an ANDA with a paragraph IV certi-
fication to market a generic version of 25 mg Toprol-XL (metoprolol succinate)
Extended Release Tablets. Although FDA stated in its July 2006 approval letter
that Sandoz failed to obtain tentative approval of its ANDA within 30 months
after the date on which the ANDA was filed, the agency noted that it would not
make a formal determination of eligibility for 180-day exclusivity at that time and
would do so only if another ANDA applicant became eligible for approval within
180 days after Sandoz began marketing its product.2 4  In a February 2008 letter
approving Perrigo's ANDA to market a generic version of Merck's Pepcid Com-
plete (famotidine 10 mg, calcium carbonate 800 mg, and magnesium hydroxide
165 mg) chewable tablets, the agency made the same comment. 242 Although Perrigo
had failed to obtain tentative approval of its ANDA within 30 months of filing,
the agency stated it would not make a formal determination as to whether Perrigo
was eligible for 180-day exclusivity unless another applicant became eligible for
approval within 180 days after Perrigo began commercial marketing of generic
Pepcid Complete.
By way of contrast, on February 20, 2008, the agency approved an ANDA submit-
ted by Watson to market a generic version of Camptosar (irinotecan hydrochloride)
Injection, 20 mg/mL, and made a determination of forfeiture because there were
other ANDAs pending. Although FDA determined that Watson was the first ap-
plicant to submit an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for Camptosar Injec-
tion, it noted that Watson did not obtain tentative approval of its ANDA within
30 months after submission and thus forfeited the 180-day period of exclusivity.2 143
Other ANDAs were ready for approval, and on February 27, the agency approved
seven other applications for generic irinotecan hydrochloride injections.
4. Prospect of Litigation
A review of FDA's judicial record since it began facing challenges to its decisions
relating to 180-day exclusivity indicates that federal courts have played an active role
in shaping the interpretation of the provisions, particularly the old provisions. Based
on our review of published and unpublished court cases, FDNs interpretation of
the 180-day exclusivity provision in matters involving the old provisions has been
litigated on 24 occasions.' The agency's decisions have been successfully challenged
slightly over one third of the time. Given FDA's failure to conduct rulemaking and
its practice of addressing interpretative issues with respect to the new provisions on
a case-by-case basis, some have suggested that the courts will have an even greater
role in shaping the application of the 180-day exclusivity provision with respect to
24 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Sandoz Inc. 2 (July 31,
2006).
242 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Perrigo R&D Co. 2-3 (Feb.
6, 2008).
243 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, FDA Office of Generic Drugs, to Watson Laboratories, Inc. 2
(Feb. 20, 2008).
244 The authors excluded all decisions in which no ruling on the merits appears, including dismissals on
procedural grounds and on jurisdictional grounds, as well as voluntary dismissals. The authors also excluded
cases brought against FDApro se and employment discrimination lawsuits. In addition, the authors excluded
enforcement cases brought by the agency.
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the new provisions, and in particular, the forfeiture provisions.245 As of the end of
February 2009, FDA had made forfeiture determinations on five occasions. 246 Before
making its decision on four of these five occasions, FDA opened a nonrulemak-
ing docket and sought comments from interested parties. The agency concluded
that the first applicant had forfeited its exclusivity in three instances. Two of these
rulings, the acarbose and dorzolamide hydrochloride/timolol maleate decisions,
were challenged in court by the first applicant. The first applicant in the acarbose
matter voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit after the court denied its motion for a TRO
to prevent the approval of other ANDAs. The first applicant in the dorzolamide
hydrochloride/timolol maleate decision carried its lawsuit further, seeking a decision
on the merits. The district court deciding that case concluded that FDXs decision
was reasonable based on the agency's interpretation of the pediatric exclusivity
provisions. As a result, no court has yet interpreted the forfeiture provisions.
The fact that two of FDA's three decisions finding forfeiture have faced court
challenges suggests that the agency's practice of deciding these issues on a case-
by-case basis will likely lead to litigation. Some observers, however, have indicated
that FDA's policy of waiting until an ANDA is ready for final approval to make
a determination of eligibility for exclusivity could, in fact, deny the first filer any
opportunity for meaningful judicial review.247 The agency, by not informing a first
applicant of its decision that the first applicant has forfeited its eligibility for 180-
day exclusivity until it is ready to approve a subsequent ANDA, may deny that
applicant a meaningful opportunity to challenge the determination of forfeiture.
Once a subsequent ANDA applicant launches its product, the value of 180-day
exclusivity is diminished.
Only one first applicant of a new ANDA thus far has brought a lawsuit seeking
to force FDA to make an advance exclusivity determination, and it did so without
success. As discussed above in section III. A. 3. b. ii., Hi-Tech argued that it was
''simply not possible" for the company to wait until the date on which the period
of pediatric exclusivity blocking ANDA approval ended to file a lawsuit and seek
and obtain relief from the court if FDA "incorrectly decide[d]" that Hi-Tech was
not entitled to 180-day exclusivity and a subsequent applicant entered the market.
FDA defended its practice by asserting, as it has in its decision letters, that the ap-
proach it has adopted "is necessary because of the many factors that may influence
eligibility for exclusivity up to the time an application is ready for approval (e.g.
patent expiration, patent delisting, failure to obtain a tentative approval within 30
months, withdrawal of ANDA) and could thus render a premature eligibility de-
243 For example, this observation was made by Robert A. Dormer at a FDLI conference on the Hatch-
Waxman amendments on February 5, 2009. See Robert A. Dormer, 180-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Mechanics,
FDA Decisions, and Recent Court Decisions, Presentation at FDLI's Waxman-Hatch: Back to the Future (Feb.
5, 2009) (stating in this slide presentation that the "[t]rend of deciding on case-by-case basis often leaves it
to the court to decide").
246 As discussed above in section III. B. 3., on two other occasions FDA noted that although the first filers
had failed to obtain tentative approval of their respective ANDAs within 30 months after the date on which
the applications were filed, the agency would not make a formal determination as to whether the companies
were eligible for 180-day exclusivity unless another applicant became eligible for approval within 180 days
after they began to market their products.
247 For example, this observation was made by Robert A. Dormer at a FDLI conference on the Hatch-
Waxman amendments on February 5,2009. See Robert A. Dormer, 180-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Mechanics,
FDA Decisions, and Recent Court Decisions, Presentation at FDLI's Waxman-Hatch: Back to the Future (Feb.
5, 2009) (noting in this slide presentation that FDA's policy regarding advance exclusivity determinations
"can preclude meaningful judicial review of FDA decisions").
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termination incorrect. ' 248 FDA also argued that its policy of not making forfeiture
decisions prior to the approval of an ANDA is "consistent with Congress's choice
to vest FDA with the authority to take and give effect to its actions, such as ap-
proving drugs, subject to subsequent challenge under the Administrative Procedure
Act." 249 The district court denied Hi-Tech's request because there had been no final
agency action. The court, however, required FDA to notify it and Hi-Tech at least
12 hours prior to release of the agency decision.
In light of this outcome, it is uncertain whether future first applicants will be
able to force FDA to make exclusivity determinations prior to ANDA approval. It
is possible that other courts could arrive at a different conclusion than the Hi-Tech
court and expect FDA to make an earlier determination of potential eligibility. For
instance, a court could require the agency to, at a minimum, make a determination
that a forfeiture event has not yet occurred.
Given the lack of judicial precedent with respect to the forfeiture provisions,
it is difficult to predict whether any future first applicants will challenge in court
FDA determinations of forfeiture, particularly if the agency contemporaneously
approves the ANDA of a subsequent filer. If, however, other first applicants con-
tinue to seek judicial relief from a determination of forfeiture and courts reach
the merits of these cases, it is uncertain whether the highly deferential standard of
review accorded under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. ,250 will be granted to FDA's decisions given the absence of rulemaking with
respect to the forfeiture provisions.2 '
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Impact of 180-Day Exclusivity
While a fairly significant body of research exists examining the impact of generic
drugs on drug prices and market shares, surprisingly there appears to be limited
research regarding the economic effects of paragraph IV certifications and 180-day
exclusivity on generic competition outside the context of authorized generics and
patent settlement payments.
The Hatch-Waxman amendments, by reducing the costs of developing generic
drugs through the creation of an abbreviated approval process and by offering
incentives to generic manufacturers, are viewed as partly responsible for the in-
creasing number of generic drugs in the marketplace.252 The increase in generic
248 Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FDA, No. 08-1495 (JDB), at
6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2008).
249 FDA's Status Report, Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. Inc. v. FDA, No. 08-1495, at 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2008)
(citation omitted).
250 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
251 Cf United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,226-27 (2001) ("We hold that administrative imple-
mentation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference.")
252 See, e.g., Anish Vaishnav, The Impact of "Authorized Generics" on Independent Generic Entry:
A Propensity Score Approach 4 (Dec. 2007) available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/econ/ugrad/theses/an-
ish__vaishnav.pdf; see also FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study i (July
2002) ("Beyond any doubt, Hatch-Waxman has increased generic drug entry."), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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drug availability and use has been paralleled by a rise in the number of ANDAs
containing paragraph IV certifications. According to the FTC, from 1984 to 1989,
only two percent of ANDAs contained paragraph IV certifications. 253 That figure,
however, grew to approximately 12 percent for the 1990s, and it increased to 20
percent from 1998 to 2000.2-4 In addition, the FTC has found, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, that paragraph IV certifications often target brand name products with
large markets. 25
Some believe the increase in paragraph IV challenges may be linked in part to
evolution of the rules governing 180-day exclusivity256 Prior to 1998, FDA granted
180-day exclusivity to only three ANDA applicants. 2 7 As discussed above in sec-
tion II.B.I., in response to a court decision in 1998, Mova Pharmaceutical Corp.
v. Shalala,2 5 s the agency abandoned its position requiring the first generic filer to
successfully defend its paragraph IV challenge before earning 180-day exclusiv-
ity. In 2000, in the wake of another court decision, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Shalala,2"9 described above in section II. B. 3. a., FDA once again modified its
interpretation of the statute and began reading the court decision trigger to allow
the first filer to enter the market after a favorable district court decision instead
of waiting for an appellate court decision. 60 Between 1998 to 2002, FDA awarded
180-day exclusivity to ANDA applicants for 31 drug products. 26' By July 2003,
more than 60 ANDAs had received an award of 180-day exclusivity.26 2 In 2003,
FDA began allowing multiple applicants to share exclusivity for the same product
if they delivered their ANDAs on the same day to agency.2163
This rise in paragraph IV certifications and awards of 180-day exclusivity ap-
pears to reflect the belief by at least some generic manufacturers that first filers have
advantages over subsequent filers. 264 For example, commentators have noted that
the first ANDA applicant may charge higher prices during the period of exclusiv-
ity because of the lack of generic competition. 265 An analysis of single ingredient
brand name and generic drugs sold in the United States from 1999 through 2004
conducted for FDA provides support for this observation. This analysis found
that the first generic manufacturer in the market, on average, sold its product at a
253 FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study 10 (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
254 Id
255 Id. at ii (noting that "[t]he brand-name products included in the study represent[ed] some of the
largest drug products as measured by annual sales").
256 See Ernst R. Berndt, et al., Do Authorized Generic Drugs Deter Paragraph IV Certifications? Recent
Evidence 5 (Apr. 2007) (working paper).
257 FTC, Generic Data Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study vi (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. Between 1992 and 1998, FDA did not award exclusivity
to any first filers. Id.
258 140 F. 3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
259 81 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
26' For old ANDAs, the MMA codified FDA's previous reading of the court decision trigger as begin-
ning when a decision is rendered by "a court from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken." As noted above, in section II. B. 3. b., there is no
court decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs, but a similar rule applies to a forfeiture event.
261 Ernst R. Berndt, et al., Do Authorized Generic Drugs Deter Paragraph IV Certifications? Recent
Evidence 5 (Apr. 2007) (working paper) (citation omitted).
262 FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Exclusivity when Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the
Same Day 3 n.4 (July 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/CDER/guidance/570fnl.pdf.
263 As noted above, in section II. A. 2. b., the MMA codified the agency's decision.
26 See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett, & Robert J. Shapiro, The Impact ofAuthorized Generic Pharmaceuticals
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price that was only six-percent lower than the brand-name price.26 6 Once a second
generic competitor entered the market, the average generic price fell precipitously
to almost half of the brand name price.2 67 The average generic price continued to
decline, but at a slower rate, as other generic products entered the market.2 68 For
products with 12 generic competitors, the average generic price was only 20 percent
of the branded price.269 In light of the average selling price of the first generic drug
in the market, some have estimated that a first filer awarded 180-day exclusivity
could, in fact, "expect a 1,000 percent return on investment. '"2 0 In addition, first
filers, by launching their generic drugs in the absence of other generic competitors,
may have the advantage of being able to enter into long-term supply contracts with
pharmacies retailing their products. 271
Some observers, however, have questioned whether awarding 180 days of market-
ing exclusivity for first filers is necessary to encourage generic drug competition,
particularly if the brand name drug has a large market. 272 Under these circumstances,
they argue, the "threat of competition" provides an incentive to first applicants to
enter the market as soon as possible, including possibly at risk, before subsequent
applicants obtain approval of their ANDAs. 2 3 If exclusivity were the primary
incentive for early generic drug entry, one might expect to find fewer subsequent
paragraph IV challenges (because subsequent ANDA applicants are not awarded
180-day exclusivity). In fact, as the FTC has noted, the reduction in incentive for
subsequent filers appears to be "small. 274 ANDA applicants have often filed para-
graph IV challenges even when they have no or only a small chance of obtaining
exclusivity. For instance, between 1991 and 1998, there were no awards of 180-day
exclusivity to first filers; yet, the number and rate of paragraph IV filings "increased
significantly" during that time.275 And, as FDA noted in 2004 when denying a Mylan
citizen petition relating to authorized generics, "[i]f 180-day exclusivity were the
sole incentive for ANDA submission, FDA would presumably not see, as we do,
second, third, and fourth ANDAs filed by generic companies that are aware that
they are not the first to file an ANDA application including a paragraph IV certi-
fication and, therefore, cannot gain 180-day exclusivity."276 These findings suggest
that 180-day exclusivity, at least with respect to certain products, is not the primary
incentive for seeking early generic entry into the market.
The authors' examination of drug products for which at least one first ANDA
applicant filed an application containing a paragraph IV certification over the last
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four years indicates that the prospect of obtaining a period of 180-day exclusiv-
ity remains, at least for some generic manufacturers, a strong incentive.277 While
the number of drugs with a first filing held steady in 2005 and 2006, at 56 and 55
respectively, that number increased dramatically in 2007 to 84. In 2008, it declined
to 70, but still represented a significant increase from 2005 and 2006. It is unclear
to the authors whether this represents a meaningful change in ANDA filing rates
or simply tracks changes in NDA approval rates (i.e., four years earlier), but it
seems that ANDA applicants in the last two years have not been deterred by the
fact that they may have to share their exclusivity periods with other first filers or
even an authorized generic. In addition, these first filers were not deterred by the
possibility of forfeiture under the new provisions. While these numbers suggest that
180-day exclusivity is an important factor generic manufacturers consider when
deciding when to file their ANDAs, it is too early to draw any conclusions about
the long-term effects of the changes included in the MMA and the emergence of
authorized generics on these applicants' incentive to obtain generic exclusivity.
B. Possible Topics for Legislation
1. Authorized Generics
As explained in the authors' 2007 article, FDA and the courts have concluded
that the FDCA does not preclude the holder of an approved NDA from marketing,
or permitting the marketing of, an unbranded version of its product-a so-called
authorized generic-during the exclusivity period or at any other time.2 78 Notwith-
standing the clear legality of this practice under the FDCA, questions regarding
the effect of authorized generics on competition, particularly during the 180-day
exclusivity period, have been raised.
Some claim that unbranded competition authorized by the innovator could
discourage generic drug manufacturers from bringing paragraph IV challenges
and marketing new generic products.279 They contend that the 180-day exclusivity
provision was intended to provide an incentive to generic drug manufacturers to
challenge patents.28 ° According to these opponents, authorized generic drugs reduce
this incentive because they force generic manufacturers awarded 180-day exclusiv-
ity to share the period of exclusivity, thereby reducing profits and hindering the
ability of these companies to recoup their litigation expenses.28" ' Authorized generic
products may, however, benefit consumers by promoting competition and reducing
drug prices.2"2 And arguably Congress indicated its support for price competition
during the exclusivity term when it expressly recognized in the MMA that multiple
277 See FDA, Paragraph IV Patent Certifications, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ppiv.htm
(as of Mar. 16, 2009).
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Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the statute "clearly does not prohibit the holder of
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first applicants could be awarded 180-day exclusivity.283 While a number of stud-
ies on the effect of authorized generics on competition have been conducted, no
consensus has been reached. 4
Some members of Congress oppose the practice. Legislation to prohibit the
marketing of authorized generics during the period of 180-day exclusivity was first
introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate during the 109th Congress28 5
and reintroduced in the 110th Congress.286 None of these bills passed out of com-
mittee before the end of either Congress. Legislation has been reintroduced in the
House of Representatives and Senate in the current Congress. 7 The House bill was
referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on January 15, 2009,
and the Senate bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions on February 26, 2009.
As noted in the authors' prior article, Congress has also considered other measures
relating to authorized generics. For instance, it included a provision in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 requiring that, after January 1, 2007, average manufacturer
price and best price include all drugs marketed under a single NDA. 288 In addition,
in 2005, Senators Grassley, Leahy and Rockefeller and Representative Waxman
requested that the FTC conduct a study on the competitive effects of authorized
generic drugs.28 9 In April 2006, the Commission published a notice announcing its
plans to examine the "likely short-term competitive effects of authorized generic
drug entry" and "likely long-term impact of entry by authorized generic drugs
on competition by generic manufacturers. '"290 As part of this study, the FTC has
requested detailed information from brand name, authorized generic, and generic
drug companies. Although the Commission initially stated that the results of the
study would be issued in 2007,291 no results had been announced prior to publication
of this article. One recent report noted that the FTC is currently in the process of
analyzing the information it has collected but stated that the Commission has not
publicly indicated the new timeframe for issuing its report.292
To facilitate this FTC study,2 93 Congress included a provision in the FDAAA
requiring FDA to publish on its website a list of all authorized generic drugs in-
283 See id. at 14; see also section II. A. 2. b.
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cluded in annual reports submitted by NDA holders since 1999.294 FDA must update
this list quarterly.295 In response to this mandate, FDA posted a list of authorized
generics on its website.296 On September 29, 2008, the agency announced that it
intended to amend its regulations to require that NDA holders include information
about authorized generic drugs in their annual reports. 97 Because FDA expected
this amendment to be noncontroversial, it published the rule as a direct final rule,
which would take effect on February 11, 2009. In accordance with FDXs guidance
on direct final rule procedures, 298 the agency simultaneously published a proposed
rule pursuant to the normal rulemaking procedures. 299 On February 10, 2009,
FDA announced that it was withdrawing the direct final rule because the agency
had received significant adverse comments and that it would develop a final rule
pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures.3°° It is not clear whether and how
the agency intends to update the list on its website in light of the withdrawal of the
direct final rule. One report, however, observed that it is unlikely the withdrawal
of the direct final rule will affect the FTC's study given that the Commission has
already assembled its own list of authorized generics based on the information it
requested with respect to the study.3"'
2. Settlement of Patent Litigation
As noted above, if a first applicant enters into an agreement with another ANDA
applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the FTC or a court finds that
the agreement violates the antitrust laws, the first applicant forfeits its eligibility for
180-day exclusivity.3 2 Thus, the standards applied by courts to determine whether a
settlement agreement violates the antitrust laws are relevant to 180-day exclusivity.
A practice that has drawn criticism from some quarters and could eventually lead
to the passage of legislation relates to the terms of settlement when innovators
and generic applicants resolve patent litigation initiated in response to the filing
of an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification and the innovator provides
something of value to the generic applicant.
The FTC has taken the position that these settlements "restrict competition at
the expense of consumers, whose access to lower-priced generic drugs is delayed,
sometimes for many years."303 Based on its opposition to these settlements, the
294 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(t).
295 21 U.S.C. § 355(t)(1)(A)(ii).
296 FDA, FDA Listing of Authorized Generics, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/AG Listing.
htm.
297 73 Fed. Reg. 56,487 (Sept. 29, 2008).
298 FDA, Guidance for FDA and Industry, Direct Final Rule Procedures (Nov. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/industry/guidance.htm.
299 73 Fed. Reg. 56,529 (Sept. 29, 2008).
300 74 Fed. Reg. 6,541 (Feb. 10, 2009). Comments from two pharmaceutical companies raised, in
general, concerns about the potentially overbroad scope of the rule, the limitations on electronic submission
of the information requested, and the fact that the rule does not prioritize currently distributed authorized
generics. Letter from GSK to Division of Dockets Management, FDA (Dec. 11, 2008) (Docket No. FDA-
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No. FDA-2008-N-0341).
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303 Hearing on H.R. 1902, Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
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Commission began to investigate and challenge these types of settlements in the late
1990s.0 4 To facilitate its review of these settlements, Congress included a provision
in the MMA requiring that all settlements reached in patent cases resulting from
paragraph IV certifications be filed with the FTC and Department of Justice for
review," 5 and it enacted the agreement forfeiture provision discussed in section
III. A. 6. Notwithstanding the FTC's opposition to payments made by innovators
to generic applicants in resolution of patent litigation and one appellate court
decision in favor of the FTC's position,"6 two appellate court decisions in 2005,
one from the Eleventh Circuit" 7 and the other from the Second Circuit,3"' upheld
such agreements. The Supreme Court declined to review either case.309 In addition,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently upheld such a settlement
agreement. 10 A petition for a writ of certiorari for this latest case was pending at
the time this article was written. In general, these appellate courts concluded that
because a patent gives the owner a right to exclude competition, payments made to
allegedly infringing applicants in exchange for a promise not to market are lawful
as long as they do not exclude competition beyond the zone of exclusion of the
patent at issue.3 1'
In response to the 2005 decisions, legislation was introduced in Congress during
the 109th and 110th Congresses that would have addressed agreements in settle-
ments of patent infringement litigation involving payments from innovators. " 2 In
essence, these bills would have set out per se rules making certain kinds of "reverse
payment" settlements, in which patent owners provide something of value to the
generic applicants, into antitrust violations. Hearings were held on the issue dur-
ing the 110th Congress, and representatives of both the innovator and generic
drug industries opposed utilizing aper se rule, favoring instead a "rule of reason"
analysis of the facts of the particular case to determine whether an agreement is
anticompetitive." 3 Although the Senate bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, it was not considered by the full Senate.3"4 Similarly, a hearing was
held by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce on one of the House bills during the
304 Id. at 2, 14.
305 See Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112 (2003).
306 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939
(2004).
"I Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
118 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005), amended, 466 F.3d 187 (2d
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
3'9 In both cases, the Solicitor General filed a brief with the Supreme Court opposing the Court's review.
Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 2007 WL 1511527, No. 06-830
(2007); Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough, Corp., No. 05-273, 2006 WL
1358441 (2006).
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filed, No. 08-1194 (Mar. 23, 2009).
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3'2 See, e.g., S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1432, 110th Cong. (2007);
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110th Congress. 15 The bill was then referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee. It, however,
was never reported out of committee. Similar legislation has been introduced in
the current Congress, and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a hearing on
the House bill on March 31, 2009.316
While the FTC has expressed support for legislation prohibiting innovator pay-
ments to allegedly infringing generic applicants,317 it has also continued to challenge
settlements involving such payments. As discussed above in section III. A. 6. b.,
the Commission filed a complaint against Cephalon in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia in February 2008,311 alleging that Cephalon engaged in
"a course of anticompetitive conduct that is preventing competition to its branded
drug Provigil."31 9 According to the FTC, "[t]he conduct includes paying four firms
to refrain from selling generic versions of Provigil until 2012. ' '32°
More recently, in January 2009, the FTC filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, challenging agreements by
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Par Pharmaceuticals Companies and Paddock Laborato-
ries "to delay until 2015 the sale of low-cost generic versions of AndroGel, a widely
prescribed branded testosterone replacement drugs, in exchange for substantial
payments from Solvay.' '3 21 The FTC has indicated that, by bringing such challenges,
it is trying to create a split in the circuit courts and increase chances of review of
the issue by the Supreme Court.
2
These challenges could have significant implications for the first filers, as well as
the subsequent generic applicants. If, as noted in section III. A. 6. b., the FTC is
successful in either of these actions at the appellate level, the forfeiture provision
could be triggered, thus resulting in a loss of all or part of exclusivity for these
first filer(s) if they have not already launched their products or, if they have, if 180
days have not already passed. Success in such challenges could also more broadly
affect the opportunities for settling litigation and, thus, the costs of challenging
and defending patents.
C. Adaptation of the Modelfor Other Contexts
As noted earlier in this article, 180-day exclusivity was designed as an incentive
to challenge innovator patents. There is evidence that it has provided some degree
"I Hearing on H.R. 1902, Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
110th Cong. (2007).
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the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 10th Cong. 1-2 (2007) (statement of the FTC).
318 FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (complaint). At Cephalon's request,
this case has been transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See FTC v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-02141 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2008).
"I Press Release, FTC, FTC Sues Cephalon, Inc. for Unlawfully Blocking Sale of Lower-Cost Generic
Versions of Branded Drug Until 2012 (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/ceph.
shtm.
320 Id.
321 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 09-cv-598, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (complaint).
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of incentive, and many products are subject to paragraph IV certifications.323 It is
less clear how much of an incentive it is, and how many paragraph IV certifications
would have been submitted in the absence of 180-day exclusivity. What is also not
clear is the extent to which the incentive leads to too much litigation, and possibly
even litigation spawned more for the opportunity to obtain the exclusivity than
would be generated just due to the substance of the patent challenge.
A more recent question is whether this type of incentive is suitable in other
contexts. The principal area in which an exclusivity incentive roughly analogous
to 180-day exclusivity has been considered is the area of developing a regulatory
approval pathway for follow-on biologics, where there could be legislation that could
lead to establishing a process for challenging biologics patents.324 The FTC held a
roundtable on issues relating to the topic of follow-on biologics and specifically
encouraged consideration whether a patent-challenge based incentive was warranted
and whether some other type of incentive was warranted.325 There were numerous
comments critical of implementing an incentive like 180-day exclusivity that could
be an incentive for increased litigation. Some favored establishing an incentive that
would encourage certain types of applications. The FTC has yet to release the results
of the roundtable. It is noteworthy that no bill on follow-on biologics introduced
during the 110th Congress contained a patent-based incentive. Two bills recently
introduced in the 111 th Congress, however, do have incentives built around filing
for and obtaining approval of certain kinds of applications (relating to the potential
for products to be considered "interchangeable").326 It remains to be seen whether
Congress will in the end favor this kind of incentive.
323 See FDA, Paragraph IV Patent Certifications, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ppiv.htm
(as of Mar. 16, 2009).
324 See S. 1695, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).
325 See 73 Fed. Reg. 51479 (Sept. 3, 2008).
326 H.R. 1548, 11 1th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1427, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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